Tim Stanyon
TH4712
During secondary education I witnessed a friend being attacked by a number of people, around about five in number and there was no-one else around. As a Christian, there being no other option than allowing the attack, would I be ethically justified to intervene with violence?
This moral dilemma concerns the justifiability of violence in defence of another. With the distinctiveness of Christian ethics a Christian is bound to look at moral dilemmas in specific ways, ways that will often conflict with the resolution of moral dilemmas in the secular sphere (Hauwerwas, 2005, 37-50). Of main importance here, is what scripture has to say of the matter within the concept of the grand biblical narrative and the anthropological presuppositions it makes, which govern Christian obligations to God and to others (Bonhoeffer ,1969,58). In addition to this there are the different theological approaches to ethics that must be taken into account, the concept of Christian realism for example. Proceeding from these two areas of enquiry is the concept of conscience and ultimately, culpability. In taking these areas into account, an accurate conclusion as to whether violence is justifiable within the boundaries of this case study should be attainable. I am aware that, “Where violence is concerned, Christians generally behave like imbecile children.” (Ellul,1970,83) and so I mean to exercise an appropriate amount of caution in my conclusions, so as to avoid this. Further, it must not be assumed that the conclusion of this essay could then be applied to other ethical dilemmas of similar ilk, for this study, like all studies, is in some respects unique and when approaching such a complex ethical situation this must be taken into account. Before beginning the decision-making process it would be beneficial here to articulate the term ‘violence’ used within the study. It is self-evident that killing is not necessary in this situation, for it seems that only minimum amounts of violence would be necessary to postpone the attack long enough to enable a hasty escape for the individual being attacked. It is this minimal violence which is termed ‘violence’ throughout the rest of the essay.
Scripture
Initially then, what should be of primary concern for the Christian are the demands of scripture and the life of Jesus as an authoritative reference point for making ethical decisions (Hauwerwas, 1986, 75-76). What has scripture to say and what is the nature of man and how does violence enter into it? The anthropological presuppositions of the Christian worldview are wholly relevant to this area of the discussion. Scripture tells of how the human is created in God’s image (Gen.1:27), and so we are to have respect for our fellows. Indeed, Christians are to “respect and restore human wellbeing and that of the rest of creation” (Cahill, 2007, 11) and “creation sponsors an ethics of responsibility…” (Cahill, 2007, 14). Thus human individuals are in some sense responsible. It is required then to never forget the importance of the human being and his/her right to self-respect (Stott, 2006, 200). Impartiality in decision-making is stressed (Lev.19:15). Matthew 5 is incredibly valuable when looking at this topic. Jesus says, “Do not resist an evil doer. But if anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also…” (Mt.5:39) and following this, “Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you…” (Mt.5:44). Paul tells the Christian “not to repay evil for evil” (Rom.12:17) and commands that, “If it is possible, so far as it depends on you, live peaceably with all.” (Rom.12:18). Thus violence and hatred are condemned, one is to respect an enemy and not retaliate violently and being peaceable is praiseworthy. Is being peaceable, therefore, the only moral obligation of the Christian? No, for it is clear that the Christian has further obligations. It has been noted that humans have to some extent a degree of responsibility, especially for other humans. This is chiefly where the conflict of the dilemma lies as there is now a divergence of equally great obligations. Believers are to, “Give justice to the weak…maintain the right of the lowly and destitute.” (Pss. 82:3-4). This demand to protect the weak and stand against evil is reflected throughout scripture and specifically in the life of Jesus of Nazereth himself (Lk.4:18). But the call to non-violence is also stressed in the person of Jesus of Nazereth (Ellul, 1970, 9), in giving himself up for others. Thus, “We feel pulled in different directions by our various roles and convictions…”(Hauwerwas, 1986, 6). I am responsible to God for others (cf. Mckenney, 2007, 242); I have two obligations fighting for precedence. In some respects, this case study provides a perfect example of a scriptural moral paradox, a tension between the obligations to justice and non-violence. It seems that scripturally then, the case concerned meets a deadlock. Violence is disagreeable, yet not ruled out, condemned but not eliminated as a possibility. The benefits of this approach highlight the fact that there is no easy answer to the question and that the dilemma cannot be solved on scriptural evidence alone, indeed this should probably be expected (Holmes, 2007, 78).
Casuistry and differing theological perspectives
It might be wise to proceed with an experiment in casuistry. If I were to step in with violence, what would be the consequences? I would be outnumbered, and therefore probably be beaten myself, but in the process giving time for my friend to get away. If I did not respond with some form of violence and let the attack proceed, my friend would be beaten severely. It is clear however, that whatever is done, it must be done out of love (1 Cor.13:1-3) and in obedience to God. The idea that, “ there is nothing worse for the aggressor than to allow him to get away with his aggression, for this simply reinforces the harmful tendency within him…for the love of him, he has to be stopped.”
(Harries, 1986, 107) is therefore quite persuasive. If this ‘realist’ perspective is true, then violence is clearly justified. But is it true? Hauwerwas (1986, 141), being a pacifist, argues that this view is incorrect. He calls for Christians, “to live in a manner appropriate to God’s kingdom that has been made present in the life of Jesus…” (Hauwerwas, 1986, 141). It should not be denied that this is what Christians should be seeking to do, but this view seems to also forget the fact that the kingdom is not yet fully consummated. Indeed, it was present in Jesus’ ministry (Mat.12:28) and is gradually breaking in, but it is still not yet fully here. And so, the ability to be realistic is required, in a period of eschatological tension it has to be acknowledged that the best way for the Christian to act now will not necessarily be the way in which he/she will act when the kingdom is consummated (Harries, 1986, 116). Thus violence, or at least some form of coercion, may in some cases be necessary despite being not in any way ideal (Ellul, 1970, 140).
Conscience
It seems to me then, that for the moment I will have to rely on conscience. First, it would be logical to articulate what I mean by conscience. I am inclined to agree with Barth (1981, 477), that conscience is in some sense “to have a share in the dignity and truth of the Word of God…” and in some way it’s “voice is that of the divine command” (Barth, 1981, 478). Proceeding from this, in understanding that violence may indeed be unavoidable, I have to ask how I should proceed. Following my understanding of the consequences of a ‘realist’ perspective my conscience tells me that using violence in order to protect my friend, even if that means sacrificing myself to be beaten, is better and more loving towards both parties than letting the attack proceed. The person in support of non-violence might now protest that, “conscience in and of itself is a variable, unsure and often defected guide.”(Holmes, 2007, 61). Nevertheless, I feel more drawn, on the basis of personal experience, to Bonhoeffer’s (1969, 55) articulation of the matter when he says that, “…it can never be advisable to act against one’s own conscience.” Indeed, due to the highly frustrating conflict of seemingly equal obligations and the silence of the natural law, I have nowhere else to turn but conscience. In large part I feel that conscience is crying out in reaction to what I feel my human nature is calling me to do, which is to do ‘nothing’, out of a cowardly selfishness and a yearning to protect myself. By no means am I here saying that those who react in non-violence are cowards, conscience may be calling them to do the opposite of what conscience is calling me to do. Indeed, I acknowledge that the pacifist will find this point highly disagreeable, however I continue to agree with Bonhoeffer (1969, 56) when he says, “Responsible action which did violence to conscience in this formal sense would indeed be reprehensible”, in that I still feel responsible for my friend and that this is validated by conscience.
Culpability and incorrect decisions
My conscience then, justifies the use of violence in this situation. But what justifies my dependence on conscience? Clearly not the fact that it is the only option available. How do I know that I am right to think that violence is justifiable in this case? Conscience has been defined in its ‘Barthian’ sense here, but can I without a doubt, be correct in trusting the judgement given to me by conscience? I have acknowledged that there is ambiguity in the ethical decision based on conscience and that due to the fallibility of humanity there may be inconsistency. But either way, both in the violent and non-violent positions concerned in this study there is in some way a reliance on conscience, and one of the two has to be chosen. On top of this, it remains that some form of moral knowledge is attainable through conscience and scholars acknowledge this (Byrne, 1999, 23), and thus I feel I am justified in putting some stock in conscience as well. It is not to be denied on the other hand, that only one of the options available will be objectively right. There is reason to believe that one is justified in doing what he thinks is right, especially in areas of ambiguity, even if it is objectively wrong. Swinburne (1989, 34) writes, “an agent is praiseworthy for his subjectively good acts, i.e. in so far as he tries to do what he believes is good.”. What I believe is right and good, that of intervening with some deal of violence, is justifiable because I believe it to be right. It sounds almost circular, but it must be remembered that this only justifies the action. This line of reasoning does not make a judgement on whether this decision is objectively right or wrong. However, both violent and non-violent positions also inherently contain some bad consequences: that of allowing injustice and that of committing acts of violence. Can I then be blamed for the bad consequences that follow my decision? It is a detestable necessity in that whatever I do I shall be at fault. Swinburne (1989, 36) states, “the agent is surely not culpable if he does his best in a situation.” and that is what I am seeking to do. Thus I cannot be blamed for the wrong that follows from my decision, in that I have done what I think is best.
Conclusion
From scripture it is understood that love is of great importance in any Christian decision. It is hoped that the decision would be exercised with love, with the same holy love as that expressed in the life of Christ. It is clear however that the varying Christian obligations to God do indeed conflict in this particular case study. There is a stalemate between justice and peace that has to be decided on extra-biblical grounds. The need to be realistic and yet ethically sensitive is stressed. Conscience laid upon us by God is the deciding factor in this moral decision, and the conscience is to be acted upon in this situation in that it does not conflict with my responsibility to do good. From the knowledge of the nature of culpability also, we know that one is justified in doing what one believes to be right, whether that involves being objectively right or not. In conclusion then, yes, the use of violence in this case study is justifiable yet undoubtedly not morally ideal. Violence is indeed detestable as is letting the weak suffer, and both should be condemned by the church despite both being in certain situations unavoidable. Christians are to herald violence as an abomination and repent when they commit acts of violence, yet not rule violence out as a legitimate possibility.
Word Count: 2004
Bibliography
Bonhoeffer, D. (1969). The structure of responsible life. In J.M. Gustafson and J.T. Laney (Ed.), On being responsible (pp. 39-74). London: SCM Press Ltd.
Byrne, P. (1999). The philosophical and theological foundations of ethics. (2nd ed.). Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd.
Cahill, L.S. (2007). Creation and Ethics. In G.Meilaender and W.Werpehowski (Ed.), The oxford handbook of theological ethics (pp.7-24). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ellul, J. (1970). Violence. London: SCM Press Ltd.
Harries, R. (1986). Reinhold Niebuhr’s critique of pacifism and his pacifist critics. In R. Harries (Ed.), Reinhold Niebuhr and the issues of our time (pp.105-121). Oxford: A.R. Mowbray & Co. Ltd.
Hauerwas, S. (1983). The peaceable kingdom. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Holmes, A.F. (2007). Ethics: Approaching moral decisions. (2nd ed.). Nottingham: Inter Varsity Press.
Mckenney, G.P (2007) Responsibility. In G.Meilaender and W.Werpehowski (Ed.), The oxford handbook of theological ethics (pp. 237-253). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stott, J.R.W. (2006). Issues Facing Christians today. (4th ed.). Grand Rapids: Zondervan.
Swinburne, R. (1989). Responsibility and atonement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
All Biblical citations taken from the NRSV.
No comments:
Post a Comment