Dissertation on the Incarnation

‘A Critical Consideration of the Strengths and Weaknesses of Contemporary Kenotic Christology’

Timothy James Stanyon

Dissertation submitted in part fulfilment of the Degree of BA in Theology for Ministry in the University of Chester, in the June of 2014.

Abstract

In contemporary theology kenotic Christology has become a popular way of making sense of the incarnation.  At the same time, many have argued against kenotic Christology in a number of different ways.  It is the aim of this study to assess the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary kenotic Christology.  It is argued that kenotic Christology is motivated by a variety of factors.  It is also argued that kenotic Christology does provide a coherent account of the incarnation.  Despite this it is demonstrated that the kenotic account isn’t necessitated by scripture, and that since it makes fundamental modifications to the traditional divine attributes it shouldn’t be held to unless it is the only coherent understanding of the incarnation.  That it is the only coherent understanding of the incarnation is challenged in the final section which points out a number of problems with kenotic methodology as well as arguing that a divine subconscious model is the best way to make sense of the incarnation.

Anti-plagiarism statement

This work is my own; it has not been submitted previously for credit in this or any other programme; and all material which has been copied or derived from other sources is explicitly acknowledged.

Signed: Tim Stanyon

Acknowledgments

This study is the result of a lot of thinking, a lot of work, and a lot of help.  I would like to thank my supervisor, the Rev. Dr. Tim Hull for his helpful comments and support as well as the librarians for their help in finding books and articles, especially inter-library loans with long German titles.  I would like to thank the other staff and my fellow students at St. John’s College for their support and fellowship throughout this study and I want to thank William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland, as well as all of the staff at Reasonable Faith for inspiring me to write this dissertation.  I would also like to thank my family and friends for their support and thoughts on the topic.  Furthermore, I want to express a big thanks to my fiancée Miriam for all the times she’s had to listen to me talk in depth about divine simplicity, kenotic Christology and abstract objects as well as offering helpful comments and support.  Most of all I would like to thank the greatest theologian, God, for his support and guidance.  It is my prayer that this study will glorify him as much as possible, and that what I’ve learnt throughout this study will be used effectively in my future ministry.

Soli Deo Gloria

Contents

Subject                                                                                                           Page Number

Title Page                                                                                                                    1

Abstract                                                                                                                       2

Anti-plagiarism Statement                                                                                          3

Acknowledgements                                                                                                    4

Contents                                                                                                                      5

Main Text:

            Introduction                                                                                                     7         

            Chapter 1: Why Kenotic Christology                                                              9

                        Kenosis in the Early Church                                                               9

                        Kenosis after the Reformation                                                            10

                        Contemporary kenotic Christology                                                     12

                        Summary                                                                                            15

            Chapter 2: The Biblical Basis for Kenotic Christology                                    15

                        Exegesis of Philippians 2.7                                                                 16

                        Contemporary Kenotic Arguments from Phil.2 and John.17             19

                        Kenotic Motifs, Functional Kenoticism and Krypsis                           20

                        Summary                                                                                            21

            Chapter 3: Kenotic Christology and Philosophical Theology                         22

                        Reasons for DDS                                                                               23

                        Criticisms of DDS                                                                               25

                        Argument for Omni-Attributes Being Essential to Deity                     27

                        Summary                                                                                            29

            Chapter 4: Kenotic Methodology and Other Incarnation Theories                 30

                        Methodology                                                                                       30

                        Two-Minds Model                                                                               32

                        Divine Subconscious Model                                                               33

                        Summary                                                                                            35

            Conclusion                                                                                                      36

            Bibliography                                                                                                    38

            Appendix                                                                                                         45

Word Count: 9957

Introduction

The term ‘kenotic Christology’ isn’t one that is likely to be heard in everyday conversation.  Nevertheless, kenotic Christology is significant both theologically and practically for the mission and ministry of the church.  The incarnation is a central doctrine of the Christian faith, and as such it is of great significance for Christian theology.  In recent years however the orthodox doctrine of the incarnation has been heavily critiqued both by Christians and non-Christians alike.  Furthermore, with the growth of Islam as well as the regular knock at the door by Jehovah’s Witnesses and Mormons, all of which argue against the traditional, orthodox view of the incarnation, a defence and articulation of the doctrine is of great importance.

            In order to counter these criticisms a number of philosophers and theologians have developed various ‘kenotic’ accounts of the incarnation, which can be broadly split into two categories: ‘ontological kenoticism’ and ‘functional kenoticism’.  Before beginning this paper, it would be wise to define these terms.  Crisp (2007, 119) provides a basic definition, “An ontological issue in Christology has to do with the being of Christ, whereas a functionalist issue in Christology is one that emphasizes one or other function that Christ performed.”  So for example, an ontological kenoticism would be one that posits Christ gave up divine attributes at the incarnation, and a functionalist kenoticism would posit that Christ retained all of the divine attributes yet limited their use.  Generally, of primary concern for this study is ontological kenoticism since it argues for a significant modification in the traditional doctrine of God and therefore when referring to kenoticism without qualification, ontological kenoticism is assumed.

            However, kenotic understandings have been criticised by a variety of scholars as unorthodox, incoherent, and impossible.  At the same time, kenoticists have argued that it is the most coherent understanding of the incarnation of Jesus Christ, as well as providing a spiritually profound Christology and consequently a greater understanding of God.  It is the purpose of this study to assess the arguments of both sides, and to reach a conclusion as to the strengths and weaknesses of kenotic Christology.  In order to do this the dissertation is split into a number of chapters.  Firstly a consideration of the context of the development of kenotic Christology as well as the variety of factors involved in motivating the theory will be offered.  This initial chapter will lay out the issues of fundamental significance for the study.  Following this will be a chapter on kenoticism and the bible, then a chapter on kenoticism and philosophical theology and finally a chapter on kenotic methodology and alternative theories of the incarnation, which will then lead to the conclusion.

            Before beginning the study, it is also worth making some comments on the scope of this dissertation.  Christology and the incarnation are particularly broad theological fields and are related to a number of other significant Christian doctrines.  It is inevitable that certain arguments and approaches to the topic will be only noted or ignored for the sake of space.  For example, it would have been interesting to spend more time on methodology, Christology from above and below, as well as how kenoticism is relevant to current discussions regarding social trinitarianism, and perhaps how one might use kenoticism or other approaches to the incarnation in answering atheistic or unorthodox critiques of the incarnation.  Furthermore, while the study is limited to the theoretical it does aim to enable practical application for mission and ministry, an area that would undoubtedly require another study to do justice to the vastness of the topic (e.g. What does it mean to be incarnational in mission and ministry?).  What is offered here provides the groundwork for further study, and although some things have been left out, all that has seemed of primary significance to the question has been discussed in order to reach an accurate conclusion.

Chapter 1: Why Kenotic Christology?

In order to understand contemporary kenotic approaches to Christology so as to be able to critically evaluate their strengths and weaknesses it will be necessary to track the historical development of kenotic Christology including its motivations and context.  This will involve examining kenotic motifs in the early church, the development of kenotic Christology following the reformation and the post-enlightenment approaches of the nineteenth century, finally reaching contemporary kenotic Christology.  It is acknowledged that in describing the features of such a broad phenomenon as the enlightenment, generalisations are inevitable, yet necessary, in order to understand kenotic Christology in context.

Section 1: Kenosis in the Early Church

The idea of self-emptying in theology of the incarnation is not a new phenomenon.  Indeed, self-emptying, whether metaphorically or ontologically, depending on exegesis, is present in the popular passage of Phil. 2.5-11. The kenosis, drawn from κενόω (Phil.2.7), was referred to frequently in the early fathers, like that of Gregory of Nazianzus (2006, 86, 95), Gregory of Nyssa, Athanasius, Cyril of Alexandria, Augustine, Origen, and Hilary of Poitiers (Pannenberg, 1968, 308; cf. Studer, 1993, 85, 122, 179, 205).  However, one must not think that this understanding of kenosis implies the limiting or giving up of the divine nature or attributes as affirmed by contemporary kenoticists.  The kenosis, in the mind of the fathers, was defined in terms of the taking on of a human nature by the Logos, not the giving up of divine attributes. This is perhaps primarily a result of the need to counter the numerous heretical Christologies that emphasized the human nature of Jesus to the detriment of his divine nature, a typical example being seen in the theology of Arius (cf. Young, 2010, 61). Thus, while the self-emptying is understood in an ontological and metaphysical way the divine nature of Jesus remains unchanged when the Logos acquires a human nature.  While this understanding of kenosis is at odds with contemporary kenotic Christology, it does provide an exegetical basis for understanding the self-emptying as literal and ontological.

           

Section 2: Kenosis after the Reformation

            It was only in the post-reformation and enlightenment period that kenosis, with reference to Jesus’ incarnation, began to describe the self-emptying as a relinquishing or limiting of divine nature and attributes.  The issue of Jesus divine attributes in nineteenth and early twentieth century kenotic Christology was preceded some centuries before in a debate as to Jesus’ use of the divine attributes in the ‘formula of concord’ (Wells, 1984, 134), the Giessen theologians opting for a “”Kenosis of use” (kenosis chreseos), whereby Christ abstained from using some of his divine powers for the duration of the incarnation.” (Law, 2010, 253).  Wells (Wells, 1984, 135) highlights the instability of the formula and its inability to provide a solution to debates concerning Jesus’ use of his divine attributes, it was, “...merely an interim settlement.”  It was only a matter of time, therefore, until the subject of Jesus’ divine attributes and their limiting had to be discussed again.

            The enlightenment, with its new emphasis on the power of reason and thus suspicion of tradition, proved to be the primary catalyst for a reconsideration of the traditional doctrine of the incarnation as well as traditional beliefs about the nature and existence of God.  The result of this emphasis on reason led to the development of a metaphysics and epistemology that proved inhospitable to traditional Christian belief (Evans, 1996, 14).  Metaphysically the universe came to be viewed as a mechanistic system in accordance with the development of scientific laws.  Since the universe was considered as self contained, that God might intervene was seen as unnecessary.  For example, Spinoza’s metaphysics, “...which...effectively identifies the action of God with the laws of nature.” (Dawes, 2001, 32) ruled out divine intervention a priori, any suspension of the natural law would constitute a contradiction within God himself.  Epistemologically, Hume’s scepticism and Kant’s transcendental idealism, which distinguished between the phenomenal and the noumenal, proved to undermine the idea that knowledge of God was even possible, let alone the incarnation of the Logos, if such an entity existed (Byrne, 2007, 16-17, cf. Byrne, 1996, 215, Guyer, 1992, 13).  Indeed, Hume’s famous criticism of miracles was not primarily ontological, but epistemic (Hume, 1963, 116).  These philosophies consequently effected biblical interpretation and the development of historical criticism.  Supernatural elements in the gospels were explained naturally, and, correspondingly, the humanity of Jesus was stressed (Dawes, 2001, 79).  It was in this challenging context that the more complex ontological and functional kenotic Christologies of the nineteenth century were developed.

            Neither was the kenotic Christology that was developed characterised by a single theory, indeed, a variety of kenotic Christologies were developed throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as is evident from the distinction between ontological and functional accounts of kenosis in the introduction (cf. Thompson, 2006, 74; Law, 2010, 255).  However, one of the unifying features of the majority of these theories was the motivation to articulate the incarnation in a logically coherent way in the light of enlightenment philosophy and historiography that did not do away with the traditional Chalcedonian understanding of the two-natures of Christ (cf. Thompson, 2006, 77-78; Brown, 2008, 249, cf.  Appendix).  Thomasius (1965, 37) writes, “...we can set down the canon that every conception of the person of the mediator that endangers either the reality of his deity, or the truth of his humanity, or the unity of his person, is an erroneous one.” 

Much emphasis has been laid on kenotic Christology as a reaction to the enlightenment, so that one might be led to agree with Brown (2008, 254) that kenotic Christology, “...can only arise within an orthodoxy that is more or less sure of its theistic premises but that feels itself under a certain pressure to give an account of the logicality of its position.” While this is true to some extent, it is reductionist.  Following the popularity of kenotic Christology in Germany, towards the end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, kenoticism received significant attention from a number of British theologians.  Mackintosh (1978, 265-266) can be quoted against the idea that the development of kenotic Christology was purely the result of the enlightenment, “This I believe to be the profoundest motive operating in the Kenotic theories – this sense of sacrifice on the part of a pre-existent One...”  Similarly, Forsyth (1948, 294), while arguing for the necessity of kenosis in order to make logical sense of the incarnation, emphasises the role of kenosis as best exemplifying the holy love of God. This is further supported by the writing of contemporary kenoticists like Evans (1996, 132, Evans, 2006, 321), who acknowledges the coherence of the ‘two minds’ model and yet prefers the kenotic model on the basis of its spiritual force  (cf. Hebblethwaite, 1987, 67).  Thus, the spiritual force of the kenotic theory should not be ignored as a motivation for its development. 

In addition, others, like Thomasius, view kenoticism as necessitated not only by logic but also by the biblical data, citing the previously mentioned Phil. 2.7 (1965, 50-56, cf. Wells, 1984, 136; MacQuarrie, 1990, 248) as well as passages such as Jn. 1.14; 3.13; 6.38; 8.23-24; 17.5; Mk. 13.32, which emphasize Jesus’ humanity and his role as a servant.  Thomasius (1965, 50) writes, “...our assertion has the whole of scripture on its side.”  Indeed, Davis (2011, 133) writes, “...my own reasons for following the kenotic route are primarily biblical”.  Whether this conclusion is justified will be discussed later, for now it must be noted that kenotic motifs in scripture act as a factor in the development of kenotic Christology.

Section 3: Contemporary Kenotic Christology

Support for kenotic theories of the incarnation gradually decreased and had almost disappeared towards the middle of the twentieth century, having been critiqued on various accounts.  Thomasius’ distinction between immanent and relative attributes was brought into question as well as the trinitarian basis for kenoticism which depended on a “...virtually tritheistic approach...” (Brown, 2008, xxii, Law, 2010, 272).  The functionalist kenotic Christology advocated by the likes of Ebrard was also criticised; an omniscience that was transposed so that it was compatible with temporal existence did not seem to make sense (Law, 2010, 273). 

Thompson (2006, 95) places the critiques of kenotic Christology into two categories; critiques from the left and critiques from the right.  Those on the right argue that it violated orthodoxy, despite the likes of Thomasius treating orthodoxy as fundamental to the success of his theory.  Those on the left “...that censure it for not being modern or historical enough.” (Thompson, 2006, 95).  It was also critiqued on the basis of divine immutability, if God is immutable, that there should be changes within the divine nature in the incarnation is a problem (cf. Pannenberg, 1968, 311; Williams, 1994, 2).  From the left, the notions of the Logos’ pre-existence, the Trinity, and thus incarnation were all criticised, and therefore those traditional formulations that had provided the basis for kenotic Christology were undermined (Thompson, 2006, 100-101).

However, a number of developments in contemporary theology, particularly in the doctrine of God, have served to revive the kenotic approach.  Of particular relevance is the concept of social trinitarianism as well as doctrines of divine simplicity, immutability and impassibility.  It has been noted that the kenoticism of the nineteenth and early twentieth century depended on an almost tritheistic approach to the trinity, an emphasis on the threeness of God as opposed to the oneness of God.  With the development of social trinitarianism in the twentieth century with its emphasis on the community and the distinction of the persons in the godhead this ‘almost’ tritheistic approach has received renewed justification.  For example, Moltmann, one of the main proponents of social trinitarianism in twentieth century theology, argued that the crucifixion was a trinitarian event on the basis of Rahner’s (Rahner, 1967, 22; Moltmann, 1993, 31; cf. Powell, 2009, 251) rule, that, “...The “economic” Trinity is the “immanent” Trinity and the “immanent” Trinity is the “economic” Trinity”.  Therefore, not only did Jesus suffer at the cross, so did the Father at the loss of his son.  In this way, Moltmann found a staurocentric, or cross-centred, foundation for beginning with an emphasis on the distinction between the persons and threeness of God as opposed to traditional trinitarian methodology that began with God’s unity.

In fact, Moltmann’s social trinitarianism is doubly significant for theological developments that challenge the traditional understanding of the doctrine of God.  In arguing for the suffering of the Trinity at the death of Jesus, Moltmann (1993, 38) developed the arguments of an increasing number of theologians against the doctrine of divine impassibility, and, consequently, divine immutability.  Thompson (2006, 105 cf. Weinandy, 2000, 1) describes the suffering of God as a new theological axiom.  The traditional criticism of Dorner (1994, 81), that kenotic Christology is erroneous on the basis of divine immutability is thus undermined. 

With the contemporary suspicion and criticism of traditional understandings of the nature of God, the doctrine of divine simplicity has also been challenged.  The doctrine of divine simplicity, which affirms that God is simple, in that he is his nature, presupposes that there can be no distinction between accidental and essential divine attributes as argued by Thomasius, since, if God has a property he could have lacked then he cannot be identical with that property (Plantinga, 1998, 228, 233).  The doctrine of divine simplicity has been challenged by the likes of Plantinga (1998, 235) who argues that it leads to an understanding of God that is not compatible with the God of the Bible.

There have also been developments in contemporary metaphysics and epistemology that have challenged enlightenment assumptions.  Evans (1996, 22) writes, “...in our post-modern situation, we have no good grounds for assuming that the natural world is a closed mechanistic system.”  This is not to say that the contemporary zeitgeist poses no problems to incarnational and specifically kenotic theology as orthodox approaches to the incarnation continue to be criticised.  Maurice Wiles (1977, 9), for example, argues that the abandonment of metaphysical claims about Jesus, “...would not involve the abandonment of all the religious claims normally associated with it.”  Therefore, there is still a need for those who see the necessity of the Chalcedonian and orthodox claims about Jesus to articulate a logical account of Jesus’ incarnation in response to various criticisms.

Summary

In this brief survey of the historical development of kenotic Christology it has been observed that the kenotic theory is the result of a variety of factors.  It has been seen as an attempt to make logical sense of the incarnation in the light of modern philosophical and historical developments.  It has been argued to be the best interpretation of the biblical data.  It has been understood as a more coherent understanding than alternate theories of the incarnation and it has been praised for its spiritual force.  In the light of contemporary trinitarian theology and other developments in the doctrine of God, the grounds have been laid for a renewed study of kenotic Christology. 

Chapter 2: The Biblical Basis for Kenotic Christology

It has already been noted that traditional kenoticists like Thomasius saw scripture as necessitating kenotic Christology.  Contemporary kenoticists like Davis (1983,130) and Evans (Davis and Evans, 2006, 314-315), while generally[1] treating scriptural passages traditionally used as a basis for kenotic Christology with some caution in light of contemporary exegesis, continue to argue that kenotic Christology best coheres with the biblical data.  In this chapter I will consider the biblical basis for kenotic Christology with special reference to Philippians 2.7, given that traditionally it has played a major role in biblical arguments for kenotic Christology and has also been used by contemporary kenoticists as illustrative, if not as justification for, kenotic Christology (cf. Davis, 1983, 130, Martin, 1997, 66-68).  Given the wealth of secondary literature it is necessary to limit the discussion to the most important points.  Of significance are those more recent interpretations that rule out the kenosis (ἐκένωσεν) of Phil. 2.7 as referring to the incarnation at all.  This includes the interpretation of Dunn who views Phil. 2.5-11 as a parallel of Adam with the human Jesus, as well as the interpretation of Jeremias (Martin, 1997, 183) who argues that Phil. 2.7 is best understood as a parallel with the suffering servant passages in Isaiah and therefore that kenosis is not concerned with the incarnation but looks forward to the crucifixion.  This will then lead to a discussion of whether the kenosis of Phil. 2.7 is literal or metaphorical, as well as some arguments from contemporary kenoticists.  The final section will contain a discussion of kenotic motifs in scripture as a whole, as well as functional kenoticism, krypsis and their implications.

Section 1: Exegesis of Phil. 2.7

In arguing that the passage of Phil. 2.5-11 is to be interpreted within the framework of Adam-Christ parallels and not the incarnation, Dunn notes a number of similarities between the two.  For example, Jesus being in the μορφῇ (form) of God is likened to Adam being made in the image of God (Dunn, 1989, 115) and ἁρπαγμὸν (generally understood as ‘grasping’) is understood as an allusion to Adam’s grasping at equality with God, in contrast to Jesus who did not consider equality with God something to be grasped (cf. Dunn, 1998, 76).  Having argued for these parallels Dunn then argues that an Adam-Christ framework cannot be refuted on linguistic grounds given the nature of allusion, which does not depend on precise meanings (Dunn, 1998, 75).  However, while it might be that Dunn’s allusions cannot be undermined if only one parallel goes against common linguistic meaning it is surely implausible if linguistic parallels are consistently undermined.  Fee (1995, 203) writes, “Dunn’s exegesis is suspect methodologically, in that it requires a considerable accumulation of merely possible, but highly improbable meanings, all of which are necessary to make it work.”  In addition it can be successfully argued that there are no linguistic parallels.  It has been shown, for example, that μορφῇ is not synonymous with εἰκών (O’Brien, 1991, 263-264) and neither does the parallel with Adam’s grasping at equality with God prove that strong since Satan only said that they would “...be like God in the sense of ‘knowing (=determining for themselves?) good and evil’.” (Fee, 2006, 31, cf. Gen 3.5).  Furthermore, this interpretation doesn’t fit well with the apparent structure of Christ’s humbling from vv.6-8 and then his parallel exaltation in vv.9-11, or the aorist tense ἐκένωσεν  which presumes a single past event (cf. Hurst, 1998, 87).  This is not to say that there are no parallels here between Jesus and Adam, ἁρπαγμὸν may well be “...a tacit allusion to Adam...” (Zerwick and Grosevnor, 1988, 595).  Rather, that the passage of Philippians 2.5-11 should not be interpreted from the assumption of an Adam-Christ framework. 

            Other arguments from parallelism have also been used to justify the idea that the emptying of v.7 does not refer to the incarnation but to Jesus’ death on the cross.  This is based on similar passages in Isaiah, particularly the suffering servant in Isaiah 53.12, who “...poured out his soul to death...”  This argument faces similar problems to the Adamic interpretation of Dunn.  For example, Hooker (1959, 120) has shown that there is a lack of parallels in v.7, given that עבד is consistently translated as παῖς not δοῦλος and that it denotes a title of honour which is clearly not what Paul intends in this context. Thus, while there might be some similarities between ἐκένωσεν and aspects of the Isaianic servant (cf. Martin, 1997, 184-185), the allusion, even if present, should not affect the meaning or structure of the passage.  Further problems are encountered when one considers the context and structure of the pericope, since to refer to the death of Christ before the incarnation would read awkwardly (Martin, 1997, 185).

            The interpretations that argue against the pericope being concerned with the descent of Christ from pre-existence, to incarnation, to the cross, arguing that the kenosis is to be interpreted apart from reference to the incarnation are therefore unsuccessful.  Given that the first premise of a kenotic interpretation, that Phil. 2.7 concerns the incarnation, is correct (cf. Thomasius, 1965, 51), the question of whether the kenosis is literal or metaphorical can be addressed.  Traditional ontological kenoticism argues that in taking the form of a slave Jesus emptied himself of the form of God (Thomasius, 1965, 52) and thus divine glory, and certain divine attributes, if not all, as argued by Gess (Thompson, 2006, 87).  However, this ontological interpretation simply doesn’t cohere with the text and it has long been dismissed by NT scholars for a number of reasons.  Firstly, that the kenosis is literal is undermined by the hymnic/poetic form of the text (Silva, 2005, 93).  Also, the primary purpose of Phil.2.5-11 is not philosophical or dogmatic but paerenetic as is evident from the preceding vv.1-4, and v.12.  These encourage humility and obedience, a humility and obedience to God that was seen in Christ who v.5 indicates as the ‘lordly example’ (Hurtado, 1984, 119; cf. Hawthorne, 1983, l, 79).  One might be criticised here of an ethical idealism that does not make sense of Jesus’ exaltation in vv.9-11 (cf. Cousar, 2009, 57).  However, in mentioning Jesus’ exultation not only is Jesus’ glorification complete, forming a chiasm, but it also reiterates the authority of Jesus’ example to the Philippian audience (Hurtado, 1984, 125). 

            Linguistically and grammatically, the literal kenotic interpretation again has problems.  In terms of linguistic evidence it should be noted that four out of five of the NT uses of κενόω are metaphorical and similar metaphors are seen throughout the Pauline literature, for example, 2 Cor. 8.9 which is again used in a paerenetic context.  Grammatically, that Jesus empties himself of the form of God is doubtful, since, “the participle λαβών is coincident with the main verb in the first line: ‘he emptied himself in that he took the form of a servant’.” (O’Brien, 1991, 218, cf. Bockmuehl, 1997, 133-134).  He did not therefore empty himself of the form of God.  This is further supported by the adversative ἀλλὰ, which contrasts the kenosis not with the form of God, but with ἁρπαγμὸν.  Given the contrast between ἁρπαγμὸν (v.6) and ἐκένωσεν (v.7), developments in the debate about the definition of ἁρπαγμὸν help understand ἐκένωσεν.  Wright has shown that, ἁρπαγμός, is best understood in this paerenetic context as an abstract noun, and therefore does not require an object.  It denotes an attitude rather than an act and might best be translated, “’Christ did not consider his equality with God as something to take advantage of...’” (Wright, 1986, 340)  Similarly, the contrasting kenosis can also be understood as abstract since it has no object (cf. Hawthorne, 1983, 85). Given that the kenosis does not require an object and, even if it did, that the object would be ‘the form of God’ is highly improbable, the traditional kenotic interpretation is further undermined. Indeed, that the emptying and taking the form of a servant presupposes that Jesus continues to be in the form of God (cf. Fowl, 2005, 94) makes the Gessian interpretation more improbable. A metaphorical interpretation of ἐκένωσεν is therefore the best.

Section 2: Contemporary kenotic arguments from Phil. 2 and John. 17

Nevertheless, contemporary kenoticists still argue that “...virtually every sensible reader of Philippians 2 allows that the Logos divested itself in the Incarnation at least of such properties as its non-servant status and its status of not having been born.” (Davis and Evans, 2006, 314).  However, this seems to assume the kenotic theory rather than establishing it.  It has already been seen that ἐκένωσεν lacks an object, it may well be, for example, that Christ has the status of being both sovereign as well as a servant, or that in being born the traditional understanding of God[2] remains unaffected[3].  Perhaps what is meant by the argument here is not that Philippians 2.7 establishes an ontological kenoticism, but that God has relative attributes.  This may well be the case, but this need not necessitate an ontological kenoticism since other incarnation theories take into account Jesus temporal birth and the idea that God has relative attributes (cf. Craig and Moreland, 2003).  It seems coherent to say that God has relative attributes and yet affirm a traditional trinitarianism which would thereby rule out kenotic Christology.

It has also been argued that John 17.5 implies an ontological kenoticism.  Davis (1983, 130) writes that in looking forward to ‘the glory that Jesus had with the Father before the world existed’ means that he currently has divested himself of his glory.  A number of responses can be made to this claim.  Firstly, it cannot be said that by looking forward to the glory he had in his pre-existence Jesus divests himself of glory in the incarnation.  The glory that Jesus asks for is qualified. “The “glory” for which Jesus is asking is here defined as “the glory that I had in your presence before the world was” (v.5). This is consistent with the notion that this “glory” is understood as the Son’s reunion with the Father...” (Michaels, 2010, 861).  In addition, glory as understood by the bible refers not to the classic attributes of God but to the shining divine presence (cf. Whitacre, 1999, 408).  What Jesus looks forward to is a different type of glory, at least in his human nature, to the glory he already has.  Indeed, Jesus ministry and “...works revealed the character of him who gave them to the Son to do, and in this way the words and deeds of Jesus revealed the Father’s glory.  But also in the Son’s obedience itself is seen the glory of God, since his humility, obedience and sacrifice reflect the love that is laying down one’s life.” (Whitacre, 1999, 407).  For example, in Heb.1.3 Jesus is described as “...the radiance of the glory of God...”  It may then be that Jesus continues to retain the property of divine glory and yet exercises it in a different way.  This need not involve an ontological or even a functional kenoticism (cf. Crisp, 2007, 121).

Section 3: Kenotic Motifs, Functional Kenoticism and Krypsis

It is clear that Phil 2.7, as well as John 17.5, is not sufficient to establish a biblical basis for an ontological kenotic Christology.  On the other hand it does emphasize the humility of Christ and his obedience to the Father in “...being born in the likeness of men.” (Phil.2.7). This entails a truly human life. One might describe this idea of self-sacrifice, humility and obedience as a kenotic motif.  Kenotic motifs seem evident throughout scripture, for example, in Hebrews 5.7-9 Jesus relies on the Father, at least in his human nature.  This must be a genuine reliance as in order for him to fully empathise with humanity[4] there can be no Docetism (Fee, 2006, 36). Again, in the gospels we see this true humanity expressed in Jesus’ lack of knowledge (Mk. 13.32; Mt. 24.26, cf. Fee, 2006, 38) and in Lk. 2.51-52 Jesus is said to grow in wisdom.  Furthermore, in Luke (cf. 4.14) and Acts (cf. 2.22; 10.38) Jesus’ works are done in the power of the Spirit (Fee, 2006, 39).  Even the gospel of John with its high Christology speaks of Jesus’ true humanity, his reliance on the Father and the continual role of the Spirit in his ministry (Jn. 3.2, 34, cf. Fee, 2006, 42, Michaels, 2010, 226).   

Fee (cf. Fee, 2006, 34) infers on this basis that scripture affirms a functional kenosis.  However, Jesus’ apparent dependence on the Father and Spirit as well as his limitation in knowledge need not entail a functional kenosis.  It might be argued that Jesus retained the ‘use’ of his divine attributes in his divine nature and not in his human nature.  Thus Jesus’ apparent limitation would be due to a form of krypsis (Crisp, 2007, 149-150).  In this case Jesus remains omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent and continues to use these properties in the incarnation, but only in his divine nature.  In addition, even if a form of functional kenoticism was affirmed in scripture it is not necessarily mutually exclusive with other incarnation theories, particularly the divine subconscious model. It is perfectly possible to advocate a subconscious model in conjunction with certain forms of functional kenoticism as is evident in the work of Loke (2013, 598, cf. Driel, 2006, 277)[5]. 

Summary

It has been observed in this chapter that the traditional argument for kenotic Christology drawn from Philippians 2.7 is unsuccessful.  It has also been seen that arguments from other scriptures do not necessitate kenoticism.  Since the scriptural data is not decisive regarding incarnation theory, though containing kenotic motifs, it is necessary to consider kenotic Christology in light of theological and philosophical arguments as well as other theories of the incarnation. This will comprise the content of the following chapters.

Chapter 3: Kenotic Christology and Philosophical Theology

Throughout the previous chapters it has been seen that kenotic Christology depends on a number of philosophical and theological presuppositions.  These philosophical and theological presuppositions include:

1)    Social trinitarianism, which emphasises the threeness of God in its theological methodology[6] (cf. Thompson and Plantinga, 2006, 170, Evans, 2002, 248).

2)    That God has contingent or relative/accidental attributes (cf. Feenstra, 2006, 146-147, Crisp, 2007, 119).

3)    That kenotic Christology can be argued from within the bounds of orthodoxy (cf. Thompson, 2006, 77-78; Brown, 2008, 249).

4)    God is immutable in a weak sense, it is his character, his faithfulness and goodness etc. and not necessarily his ‘omni’ attributes that remain the same (cf. Thompson and Plantinga, 2006, 166, 172, Crisp, 2007, 119).

5)    Both 2 and 4 also entail that God is, at least from creation, eternal within time.

In addition, each of these presuppositions is dependent on the falsity of the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS).  It is therefore of “...extraordinary framework significance...” (Wolterstorff, 1991, 531, cf. Kraal, 2011).  The DDS basically argues that God is ontologically simple; he has no composition.  God doesn’t ‘have’ properties, God is his properties (or in certain contemporary arguments his ‘property instances’ cf. Mann, 1982, 457).  If God is identical to his properties and essentially indivisible, making significant ontological distinctions when speaking of God is questionable, including the emphasis of social trinitarians on God’s ‘threeness’.  This entails the impossibility of God having accidental attributes, since “...he would depend upon something non-divine (i.e. the accident) for some aspect of his being.” (Dolezal, 2014, cf. Stump and Kretzmann, 1985, 354).  Furthermore, this would also mean that God is timeless since contingent statements cannot be said of God.  If DDS is successful, kenotic Christology is incoherent from the start, and since DDS has such significance for how one understands the nature of God it deserves to be critically considered in this chapter.  This chapter shall be split up into three sections, firstly a consideration of the motivation for DDS, secondly a critique of the doctrine and thirdly whether it might still be argued, apart from DDS, that the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence can be considered essential attributes of deity.

Section 1: Reasons for DDS

The argument for DDS typically draws on the idea of God’s aseity, understood as his necessary being and independence of other ontological entities.  One of the fundamental problems of articulating such a doctrine is how God is understood in relation to abstract objects; for example, properties, sets, numbers and propositions etc. (Plantinga, 1998, 226).  These Platonic categories pose a problem to God’s aseity since they appear to be just as necessary as God.  If God is ‘just’ then the property of being ‘just’ must exist necessarily since, if it was created, God could not be described as necessarily just.  This would mean, therefore, that God is dependent on things apart from himself for his identity, which undermines the traditional theistic understanding of divine aseity (cf. Swinburne, 1994, 162).  Conversely, the property of justice would not necessarily be dependent on God for its existence since it is ontologically distinct.  However, it follows from the doctrine of creation, as well as perfect being theology, that God is creator of everything apart from himself (Kraal, 2011).  This is the problem that DDS seeks to solve. 

            However, in arguing for the doctrine of divine simplicity on this basis the majority of DDS advocates seem to assume a false dichotomy.  Mullins (2013, 194) writes, “It is not clear to me that simplicity is needed to satisfy the Sovereignty-Aseity Conviction.  This is because arguments of this sort typically assume that there are only two options about the relationship between God and abstract objects – Platonism or divine simplicity.”  Contrary to the DDS advocate there are a wide variety of possible approaches to God and abstract objects that preserve the doctrine of divine aseity.  Craig (2014) offers a helpful chart of the various options with reference to mathematical objects.  See Fig 1:

(Fig. 1.)

Of these, there are a number of promising arguments for both divine conceptualism and particularly figuralism, since this does away with the idea of abstract objects yet retains the truthfulness of property statements by thinking that Platonic language is figurative and not literal (Craig, 2014).  Similarly, Swinburne (1994, 162) writes that DDS “becomes quite unnecessary once we abandon Platonism and acknowledge that abstract entities are not constituents of the universe but mere convenient fictions.”  Furthermore, even if one was to adopt a realist approach to abstract objects by saying that both God and abstract objects necessarily exist one is simply reflecting “...the logical relation which holds between propositions about necessarily existent entities, and alone implies nothing about the ontological dependence or independences of those entities.” (Morris, 1991, 116).  It may be that God, while not being causally prior to abstract objects, is explanatorily prior in some sense (cf. Plantinga, 1998, 257).  Given these considerations the primary motivation for DDS is undermined.

Section 2: Criticisms of DDS

Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that DDS leads to a variety of philosophical and theological problems.  Some have argued that it is rooted in neo-platonic philosophy and is therefore antithetical to the biblical understanding of God (DeWeese, 2004, 167).  The problem with this criticism is that it commits the genetic fallacy, simply naming the doctrine’s origins doesn’t falsify that doctrine.  Indeed, there are a number of doctrines that orthodox Christians accept that are rooted in a neo-platonic metaphysics, or were developed within a neo-platonic context.  One example would be the trinity (cf. Studer, 1993, 169, Swinburne, 1994, 192).  However, this consideration does serve to highlight the need for caution in dealing with such doctrines.

            Of greater significance is the argument developed by Plantinga (1998, 235); if God is identical to his properties, he is those properties, “...he isn’t a person but a mere abstract object; he has no knowledge, awareness, power, love, or life.”  In addition, “It is virtually universally agreed that abstract objects, if they exist, are causally impotent, that is to say, they do not stand in cause-effect relations.” (Craig, 2012).  The number 7, for example, can’t ‘cause’ anything.  In the same way, if God is identical to his properties he can’t cause anything.  But that God is the cause of the universe is an axiom of Christianity.  One reply might be to say that simplicity was not understood as problematic to Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas (cf. Davies, 2010, 37).  Though it may well be that all three were wrong.

             A better reply has been articulated by altering the doctrine so that God is not identical to his properties but is identical to his property instances (Mann, 1982).  This means that God is identical, not to an abstract object but to a concrete object or particular (cf. Morris, 1985, 301), thus navigating the initial criticism, that God is identical to an abstract object.  A helpful distinction would be, “...between the rectangularity of this page, as a feature of the page existing in space and time, and the property of rectangularity, which exists only as an abstract object.” (Morris, 1985, 301).  However, the problem appears when one recalls the initial motivation for divine simplicity; the problem of abstract objects in relation to divine aseity.  Property instances are instances of an independently existing abstract property, the rectangularity of this page being an instance of the abstract property rectangularity.  This would imply that God is an instance of an independently existing abstract object which, consequently, would undermine the idea of God’s independence of other ontological entities (cf. Morris, 1985, 302).

            Another problem for property simplicity appears when one considers the fact that if God is identical to his properties, distinctions cannot be made between those properties.  For example, God’s omniscience is his omnipotence, and his wisdom is his goodness etc.  “It is impossible that there be any real distinction between one essential property and another in God...” (Stump and Kretzmann, 1985, 354, cf. Lemmon, 1965, 162).  However, if no real distinctions can be made between God’s attributes it is difficult to comprehend how one can talk meaningfully of God’s goodness, wisdom, or omniscience etc.  It might be argued that when we ascribe properties to God we are using “...non-synonymous expressions designating quite distinct manifestations of one and the same thing.” (Stump and Kretzmann, 1985, 356-357).  However, it has already been noted that there are no distinctions on DDS.  The main arguments for the doctrine of divine simplicity are therefore unsuccessful given both the removal of its motivation and the probability of its incoherence.

Section 3: Argument for Omni-attributes Being Essential to Deity

The philosophical and theological presuppositions of kenotic Christology remain intact.  Nevertheless there still seems to be good reasons to believe that the essential premise of DDS, that God is in some sense a metaphysical unity, is true to some extent and that therefore his Omni-attributes are essential to his being (cf. Morris, 1986, 93-93, DeWeese, 2004, 260). This would also undermine a central presupposition of kenotic Christology, that the Omni-attributes are accidental properties of deity.  There are two reasons for thinking that the Omni-attributes are essential to deity; the first derived from perfect being theology, the second derived from natural theology.

            Perfect being theology basically affirms that “God is a being with the greatest possible array of compossible great-making properties.” (Morris, 1991, 35, cf. Leftow, 2004, 132).  God is perfect.  From this premise one makes use of their basic intuitions about great-making properties to work toward an articulation of what a perfect being might look like.  Furthermore, great-making properties have traditionally been understood to include omniscience, omnipresence and omnipotence simpliciter (cf. Feenstra, 2006, 163).  Indeed, prima facie, it seems better to have these attributes than to lack them.  In addition to these Omni-attributes it also seems to be better to be stable than unstable (Morris, 1991, 108), which implies that God has these great-making properties essentially and that we should consider them essential unless there is a good reason to think otherwise.  Furthermore, it seems logical to say that for a being to be omnipotent, that being must also have omniscience and omnipresence.  “While conceptually we may discuss God’s wisdom apart from his omnipotence, divine wisdom cannot exist apart from divine power.” (DeWeese, 2004, 260) The Omni-attributes seem to be coextensive; indeed, this intuition seems to be supported by scripture itself (cf. Pss. 147.4-5).  However, it is important to remember that intuitions about what constitutes a great-making property are defeasible and thus perfect being theology should not be our only way of articulating the nature of God (Morris, 1991, 43).  As Christians, scripture is of greatest importance, and this is of significance when one considers the theological methodology of kenotic Christology, a subject which will be covered in the next chapter.

            The second reason for thinking that the Omni-attributes are essential to deity is drawn from natural theology.  The traditional arguments for God’s existence consistently reach the conclusion of an all powerful, all knowing creator God.  For example, Swinburne (1994, 232) argues that “all the arguments to the existence of God are arguments to a simple source of all...to whom omnipotence and omniscience belong essentially”.  A paradigmatic example would be some form of the cosmological argument.  If God caused the creation of the universe ex nihilo, the implication is that he must be, timeless, immaterial and extremely powerful.

            Furthermore, the idea that omnipotence is an accidental attribute of deity implies that it is possible that God could not be wholly in control of the universe since there is a possible world in which each member of the Trinity lacks the property of omnipotence, which seems to be blatantly false (Swinburne, 1994, 232).  In order to avoid this problem a reformulation of omnipotence would be necessary.  For example one could claim that God has the property of being ‘omniscient-unless-freely-and-temporarily-choosing-to-be-otherwise’ or ‘omniscient-unless-kenotically-incarnate’ (cf. Morris, 1986, 99-100, Feenstra, 2006, 153, Poidevin, 2012)[7].  However, that these kinds of properties exist is doubtful.  Craig and Moreland (2003, 607) write, “These contrived properties are not attributes in the sense of capacities or qualities but are really statements masquerading as attributes...like “Christ remains divine even if he temporarily gives up omniscience...” which simply repeats the problem.  A more convincing reply would be the claim that, given social trinitarianism[8], “...the divine persons may differ in the modal status of their attributes...” (Morris, 1986, 94, cf. Evans, 2002, 258).  The Son, unlike the Father and Spirit, might only have omnipotence as a contingent attribute, although since omnipotence remains essential to both the Father and the Spirit, the Godhead can still be said to be omnipotent. 

            A kenotic account of the Omni-attributes can thus be formulated, however it is very complex as well as ad hoc (cf. Forrest, 2000, 130, Senor, 2011, 105)[9], and the complexity of hypotheses should serve to highlight the need to approach them with caution, since the best explanation of the facts is generally the simplest.  However, if kenotic Christology is the only coherent way of making sense of the incarnation, this more complex approach to the Omni-attributes must be considered the best.

Summary

It has been observed then that kenotic Christology is dependent on a number of presuppositions all of which were dependent on the failure of the doctrine of divine simplicity.  In considering the DDS, it was argued that it is both unnecessary and incoherent and thus poses no problem for kenotic Christology.  However, it was also acknowledged that its basic intuition of God’s metaphysical unity was sound.  From this it was argued on the basis of both perfect being theology as well as natural theology that the Omni-attributes (simpliciter) should be considered essential predicates of deity unless scripture and the incarnation necessitated their contingent status.  This now leads to a discussion as to whether the incarnation requires that the Omni-attributes be considered contingent, and thus to the kenoticists theological methodology in comparison to other approaches to the incarnation.

Chapter 4: Kenotic Methodology and other Incarnation Theories

In the previous chapter it was argued that the Omni-attributes simpliciter should be considered essential attributes of deity given perfect being theology, natural theology and the complexity of kenotic revisions of these properties, unless there was a good reason to think otherwise.  It is the kenotic view that there is a good reason to think otherwise.  It has already been argued that kenotic Christology is possible; the question is whether it is unnecessary.  This chapter draws on the observation of Coakley (2006) addressing the question of whether kenotic Christology rests on a mistake in unnecessarily positing kenosis as the only coherent way of understanding the incarnation.  In order to reach an accurate conclusion the methodology of kenotic Christology will be considered, and following this initial discussion an investigation into how it compares to other theories of the incarnation including the two-minds model and the divine subconscious model.

Section 1: Methodology

The majority of kenoticists have typically assumed that in order to provide a coherent theory of the incarnation it is necessary for Jesus to divest himself of certain divine attributes.  To say that Jesus has both the traditional divine attributes as well as a human nature is paradoxical (Davis, 1983, 122).  For example, Jesus cannot be omniscient since he takes on the limits of a human brain; neither can he be omnipresent since he takes on a spatially located human body (Evans, 2002, 262-263; 2006, 198). Davis (1983, 124) writes that, “...the fact that I believe both that Jesus Christ was God and that Jesus Christ was non-omniscient leads me to deny that omniscience is essential to God.”  There is, supposedly, a contradiction in assigning these two apparently mutually exclusive natures to the one person Jesus Christ.  In addition, since we learn from scripture that Jesus apparently lacked omniscience (Mk.13. 32) one’s Anselmian intuitions, which mostly imply that God has the Omni-attributes simpliciter essentially, must be dismissed.  Many kenoticists make much of the idea that Jesus, being the special revelation of God, indeed, God incarnate, should take priority in forming one’s concept of God.  I, as well as the vast majority of orthodox Christians, would agree that this is true.  Furthermore, if there is a contradiction between the deliverances of reason and the deliverances of scripture, scripture should take priority.  However, while agreeing with this premise, I think there are good reasons to think that the contradiction between the Anselmian view of God and the biblical view of God so often assumed by kenoticists, is not a contradiction at all.  Similarly, there is a significant problem with Davis’ argument that since Jesus was apparently non-omniscient, omniscience cannot be an essential property of deity.  Holmes (2008) highlights the flaw, “The incarnation must decisively affect how we confess such things as impassibility and simplicity, of course, but, unless we are monophysites, we cannot form a straightforward argument from the Incarnation to a refusal to attribute such things to God.”  Unless Jesus has one nature, one is obliged to ask “...could it be that the philosophical contortions required to make the notion of divine ‘retraction’ plausible are unnecessary, and thus ‘rest on a mistake’?” (Coakley, 2006, 248).

             One of the problems with the typical kenotic answer to this question is that often a false dichotomy is assumed between kenoticism and more traditional Christologies.  For example, Feenstra (2006, 146-148) offers a list that seems to imply that the only available options for orthodox theologians are mystery, reduplication, or kenotic Christology. However, this list of available options misses the primary rival of the kenotic account, the two-minds model.  Yet, even those who acknowledge the two-minds model generally assume that the only two available theories for orthodox Christology are kenotic Christology or the two-minds model (cf. Evans, 2002, 251; 2006, 197. Bayne, 2001, 126, Hick, 1993, 61).  While it is true that the two-minds model is perhaps the most famous contemporary approach to the incarnation, it is certainly not the only other orthodox option alongside kenoticism.  Indeed, in recent years a divine subconscious model has been developed which seems to combine insights from a variety of theories (cf. Loke, 2012).  In order to establish whether kenotic Christology is necessary to make sense of the Incarnation it is therefore also necessary to consider it in comparison to these theories.

Section 2: The Two-Minds Model

The two-minds or divided mind model has been most famously argued for by Morris (1986) and Swinburne (1994).  It is their view that Jesus had two minds or two streams of consciousness, one human and one divine.  The human mind was non-omniscient and the divine mind continued to be omniscient.  In order to make sense of this, the two-minds model posits what has been called an asymmetric accessing relation between the divine mind and the human mind.  “The human mind was contained by, but did not itself contain, the divine mind; or, to portray it from the other side, the divine mind contained, but was not contained by, the human mind.” (Morris, 1991, 169-170).  This distinction between minds offers a helpful way of understanding how Jesus could be both omniscient and yet, in accordance with Mk.13, not ‘knowing the day or the hour’ of the eschaton, as well as making sense of how the two natures might be ascribed to the one person in accordance with Chalcedon.  One might argue in reply that such a model is false since it seems apparent that no human has two-minds, or similarly, no human can be omniscient or omnipresent (cf. Evans, 2002, 262-263; 2006, 198).  The problem with such an objection is that it is based on a certain understanding of anthropology according to which the majority, if not all humans, have one mind, therefore having one mind is an essential property of being human.  Such an objection can be dealt with by making a distinction between ‘individual-essence’ and ‘kind-essence’.  For example, “There are properties which happen to be common to members of a natural kind, and which may even be universal to all members of that kind, without being essential to membership in the kind.” (Morris, 1994, 164, cf. Erickson, 1987, 736-737).  Simply because all humans, in our experience, possess the property of ‘having one mind’ doesn’t necessarily imply that the property of ‘having one mind’ is essential to human nature. 

            A more significant objection to the two-minds model is the argument that in predicating two minds of Jesus, one is attributing two ‘I’s to one person.  It is difficult to see how, in attributing two ‘I’s to Jesus, one can avoid the implication of two persons. This leads to the Nestorian heresy.  In order to get around this problem Bayne (2001, 127-128) has highlighted that both Morris and Swinburne’s models assume what has been called a ‘concurrent’ view of the two consciousnesses.  They exist alongside each other at the same time.  Bayne (2001, 138) then argues that a better way to understand the two consciousnesses, in order to avoid the conclusion of two persons, would be to understand the consciousnesses as existing consecutively.  Thus the two-minds or consciousnesses did not exist simultaneously.  This certainly seems to solve the Nestorian problem.  However, it has a number of problems of its own.  Most significantly, on this type of model of divine consciousness “...the Son is only ever divine or human but never both.” (Jedwab, 2011, 182).  In which case, traditional Christian soteriology is in jeopardy since, in order to save humanity, Jesus, in accordance with Chalcedon, must have both a divine nature and a human nature.  Therefore, the two-minds model is limited[10] in its ability to make sense of the incarnation within the constraints of orthodoxy. 

Section 3: The Divine Subconscious Model

Nevertheless, the two-minds model does provide a foundation from which to develop similar models of the incarnation drawn from an emphasis on the mind of Christ.  Interestingly, Morris (1991, 171) notes how similar the two-minds model is to the standard distinction made between one’s conscious and subconscious.  Indeed, “One of the best analogies may be provided by the claim of twentieth-century psychologists that every normal human being partakes of a variety of levels of mentality.” (Morris, 1991, 171, cf. Swinburne, 2008, 42).  Similarly, Bayne (2001, 138) writes, “Perhaps Christ remained omniscient (and omnipotent) while incarnate, but...most of his knowledge was not consciously accessible to him.  It was, if you like, dormant.” This kind of observation has led a number of theologians to develop a divine subconscious model of the incarnation.  Essentially, this model argues that the traditional Omni-attributes are retained by the Logos at the incarnation but are stored in his subconscious.  “Thus Jesus possessed a normal human conscious experience.  But the human consciousness of Jesus was underlain, as it were, by a divine subconscious.” (Craig and Moreland, 2003, 610, cf. Jedwab, 2011, 182). Jesus then uses his omnipotence subconsciously to retain his omniscience in his divine subconscious (Loke, 2013).

            It might be asked how Jesus can be omniscient without actually being consciously aware of his divine knowledge.  However,”...to possess knowledge of any true proposition y, it is not required that the belief concerning y be consciously held.” (Loke, 2009, 53).  Indeed, there are plenty of things that people know, many of which they are not consciously aware of.  For example, one knows that 2+2=4 without having to be constantly consciously aware of it.  This view, then, makes sense of Jesus’ lack of knowledge in Mk 13, in that it was not consciously available and yet he was omniscient in that he knew everything in his divine subconscious.  Furthermore, it is also possible, given these considerations, for Jesus to continually sustain the world subconsciously (the ‘extra calvinisticum’) while at the same time living out a normal human life.  This model also avoids the problem of Nestorianism since it posits one and not two minds of the one person Jesus Christ.  And it also bears a resemblance to functional kenoticism, in that God limits his Omni-attributes to the divine-subconscious of Jesus, in order to live out a fully human life.

            However, it has been argued that this model is unorthodox.  Having one mind would seem to imply that Jesus has one will, known as monethelitism, which is a problem, since “the Sixth Ecumenical Council of Constantinople repudiated monothelitism in AD681.” (Crisp, 2007, 35, cf. Appendix).  Of course, one’s theological conclusions should conform as much as possible to the ecumenical councils[11]; however, in terms of the sixth ecumenical council of Constantinople this is not necessary since “Protestant communions have typically affirmed the findings of the first four councils.” (Crisp, 2007, 49)  Indeed, this view is completely in line with the findings of the first four ecumenical councils; Jesus is one person with both a human and a divine nature (cf. Appendix for the council of Chalcedon’s ‘Definition of Faith’).  Neither is the amount of Jesus’ wills specified in scripture.  It might be argued that, “...it is difficult to see how Christ could be said to be fully human without having a human will that is distinct from the divine will.” (Crisp, 2007, 49).  Although, in response, it might be argued that the Logos already possessed the necessary characteristics of a human nature within his divine nature, and thus in taking on a human body, brought to it all of the necessary properties for a full human nature (Craig and Moreland, 2003, 608).  Therefore, this view, in comparison to the two-minds model, can overcome the arguments levelled against it.  Neither does it require a complex revision of the classical divine attributes.

Summary

In this chapter it has been seen that kenotic Christology is dependent on the premise that the essential divine attributes are incompatible with the essential human attributes.  Following the discussion of this premise, it was questioned by comparing the kenotic account with other contemporary approaches to the incarnation.  It was observed that the two-minds model seemed insufficient yet provided some helpful insights into the nature of Jesus’ consciousness.  These insights were then developed through a divine subconscious model that affirmed both Jesus’ limitations as well as his possession of the Omni-attributes.  It was also observed that it dealt well with the criticisms made against it.   The success of the divine subconscious model in offering an orthodox account of the coherence of the incarnation shows that kenotic Christology rests on a mistake.  The assumed contradiction between the two natures that forms the basis of the kenotic account is not a contradiction at all.  Therefore, one is not obliged to accept the kenotic model, even though it does make sense of the incarnation, because it posits an unnecessary modification of the traditional attributes of deity.

Conclusion

Throughout this study, kenotic Christology has been considered from a variety of angles; its historical development, its biblical basis, how it relates to the doctrine of God and how it compares to other theories of the incarnation.  In the second chapter it was observed that, despite the claims of a variety of kenotic christologists, it was not necessitated by the biblical data.  Indeed, neither was there any real reason to consider it as better cohering with the biblical data in comparison to other theories.  Following the results of the biblical investigation, kenotic Christology was considered within the context of philosophical theology, primarily with regard to the doctrine of divine simplicity and essential and accidental attributes.  It was argued that although the doctrine of divine simplicity was in all probability incoherent it was right in that it argued for God as a metaphysical unity, possessing the Omni-attributes as essential.  However, while it was acknowledged that the Omni-attributes should be considered essential, it was also acknowledged that the arguments that led to this understanding of the divine nature were defeasible.  If the kenoticist could show that there was a good reason to think that the incarnation or scripture necessitated the kenotic account, then the Omni-attributes should be considered accidental.  It was argued in the last chapter that this premise, that the divine and human nature contained mutually exclusive properties, is false.  In comparing kenotic Christology with two of the most famous contemporary accounts of the incarnation, the two-minds model and the divine subconscious model it was argued that the divine subconscious model made sense of the incarnation without positing any major changes in the doctrine of God.  Kenoticism, while coherent, was unnecessary, making unjustified modifications to the traditional doctrine of God.  Thus, while its strengths included being spiritually profound and being a coherent understanding of the incarnation, it was not as successful as the divine subconscious model.  This is not to say that kenotic Christology is irrelevant to the mission and ministry of the church.  Indeed, it provides an understandable account of the incarnation that could well prove helpful in evangelism and apologetics.

Bibliography

Bayne, T. (2001). The Inclusion Model of the Incarnation: Problems and Prospects. Religious Studies, 37/2, 125-141.

Bockmuehl, M. (1997). The Epistle to the Philippians. (4^th ed.). London: A & C Black.

Brown, C. (2008). Jesus in European Protestant Thought 1778-1860. Pasadena: Fuller Seminary Press.

Byrne, P. (2007). Kant on God. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.

Byrne, J. (1996). Glory, Jest and Riddle. London: SCM Press Ltd.

Cousar, C. B. (2009). Philippians and Philemon. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press.

Craig, W. L., and. Moreland, J. P. (2003). Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. Illinois: InterVarsity Press.

Craig, W. L. (2012). God and Abstract Objects. Retrieved May 16, 2014, from http://www.reasonablefaith.org/god-and-abstract-objects-oct-2013

Craig, W. L. (2014). God and the Platonic Host. Retrieved May 16, 2014, from http://www.reasonablefaith.org/god-and-the-platonic-host

Crisp, O. D. (2007). Divinity and Humanity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Davis, S. T. (1983). Logic and the Nature of God. London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd.

Davies, B. (2010). Simplicity. In C. Taliaferro and C. Meister (eds.), Christian Philosophical Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 31-45.

Davis, S. T. (2011). The Metaphysics of Kenosis. In A. Marmadoro and J. Hill (eds.), In The Metaphysics of the Incarnation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 114-133.

Davis, S. T., and Evans, C. S. (2006). Conclusion: The Promise of Kenosis. In C. S. Evans (ed.), Exploring Kenotic Christology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 313-321.

Dawes, G. W. (2001). The Historical Jesus Question. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press.

DeWeese, G. J. (2004). God and the Nature of Time. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

Dolezal, J. E. (2014). Trinity, Simplicity and the Status of God’s Personal Relations.  International Journal of Systematic Theology, 14/1. Retrieved May 16, 2014, from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.voyager.chester.ac.uk/enhanced/doi/10.1111/ijst.12016/#Survey

Dorner, I. A. (1994). Divine Immutability. (First Fortress Press ed.). Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

Driel, E. C. V. (2006). The Logic of the Assumption. In C. S. Evans (ed.), Exploring Kenotic Christology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 265-290.

Dunn, J. D. G. (1989). Christology in the Making. (2^nd ed.). London: SCM Press Ltd.

Dunn, J. D. G. (1998). Christ, Adam and Preexistence. In R. P. Martin and B. J. Dodd (eds.), Where Christology Began. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, pp.74-83.

Erickson, M. J. (1987). Christian Theology. Basingstoke: Marshall, Morgan and Scott Ltd.

Evans, C. S. (1996). The Historical Christ and The Jesus of Faith. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Evans, C. S. (2006). Conclusion: The Promise of Kenosis. In C. S. Evans (ed.), Exploring Kenotic Christology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 313-321.

Evans, C. S. (2002). The Self-Emptying of Love: Some Thoughts on Kenotic Christology. In S.T. Davis, D. Kendall and G. Collins (eds.), The Incarnation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 246-272.

Fee, G. D. (1995). Paul’s Letter to the Philippians. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Fee, G. D. (2006). The New Testament and Kenosis Christology. In C. S. Evans (ed.), Exploring Kenotic Christology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 25-44.

Feenstra, R. J. (2006). A Kenotic Christological Method for Understanding the Divine Attributes. In C. S. Evans (ed.), Exploring Kenotic Christology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 139-164.

Forrest, P. (2000). The Incarnation: a philosophical case for kenosis. Religious Studies, 36/2, pp. 127-140.

Forsyth, P. T. (1948). The Person and Place of Jesus Christ. (6^th ed.). London: Independent Press Ltd.

Fowl, S. E. (2005). Philippians. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.

Grosevnor, M., and Zerwick, M. (1988). A Grammatical Analysis of the Greek New Testament. (3^rd rev ed.).

Guyer, P. (2006). Kant. Abingdon: Routledge.

Hawthorne, G. F. (1983). Word Biblical Commentary Volume 43 Philippians. Waco: Word Incorporated.

Hick, J. (1993). The Metaphor of God Incarnate. London: SCM Press Ltd.

Holmes, S. R. (2001). ‘Something Much Too Plain to Say’: Towards a Defence of the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity. Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie. 43/1, 137-154.

Hooker, M. D. (1959). Jesus and the Servant.  London: SPCK.

Hume, D. (1963). Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. (2nd ed. Impression of 1963). London, Oxford University Press.

Hurst, L. D. (1998). Christ, Adam and Preexistence Revisited. In R. P. Martin and B. J. Dodd (eds.), Where Christology Began. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, pp. 84-95.

Hurtado, L. W. (1984). Jesus as Lordly Example in Philippians 2:5-11. From Jesus to Paul. Retrieved April 23, 2014, from http://larryhurtado.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/jesus-as-lordly-example.pdf

Kraal, A. (2011). Logic and Divine Simplicity. Philosophy Compass, 6/4, pp. 282-294.

Jedwab, J. (2011). The Incarnation and Unity of Consciousness. In A. Marmadoro and J. Hill (eds.), The Metaphysics of the Incarnation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 168-185.

Law, D. R. (2010). Kenotic Christology. In D. Fergusson (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth-Century Theology. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 251-279.

Leftow, B. (2004). Anselm’s Perfect-Being Theology. In B. Davies., and B Leftow (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Anselm. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.132-156.

Lemmon, E. J. (1965). Beginning Logic. Berkshire: Van Nostrand Reinhold (UK) Co. Ltd.

Loke, A. (2009). On the Coherence of the Incarnation. Neue Zeitschrift fur systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, 51/1, 50-63.

Loke, A. (2013). The Incarnation and Jesus’ Apparent Limitation in Knowledge. New Black Friars, 94/1053. Retrieved April 23, 2014, from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.voyager.chester.ac.uk/doi/10.1111/j.1741-2005.2012.01500.x/full#nbfr1500-note-0023

Mackintosh, H. R. (1978). The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ. Edinburgh: T&T Clark Ltd.

MacQuarrie, J. (1990). Jesus Christ in Modern Thought. London: SCM Press Ltd.

Mann, W. E. (1982). Divine Simplicity. Religious Studies, 18/4, pp. 451-471.

Martin, R. P. (1997). A Hymn of Christ. Illinois: InterVarsity Press.

Michaels, J. R. (2010). The Gospel of John. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Moltmann, J. (1993). The Trinity and the Kingdom. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

Morris, T. V. (1985). On God and Mann: a View of Divine Simplicity. Religious Studies, 21, 299-318.

Morris, T. V. (1986). The Logic of God Incarnate. Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers.

Morris, T. V. (1991). Our Idea of God. Illinois: InterVarsity Press.

Mullins, R. T. (2013). Simply Impossible: A Case Against Divine Simplicity. Journal of Reformed Theology, pp. 181-203.

Nazianzus, G. (2006). Oration 14: On the Love of the Poor. In B. E. Daley (ed.), Gregory of Nazianzus. Abingdon: Routledge, pp.75-98.

Norris, R. A. (1980). The Christological Controversy. Philadelphia: Fortress Press.

O’Brien, P. T. (1991). The Epistle to the Philippians. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Pannenburg, W. (1968). Jesus, God and Man. London: SCM Press.

Plantinga, A. (1998). Does God Have a Nature?. In J. F. Sennet (ed.), The Analytic Theist, an Alvin Plantinga Reader. Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, pp. 225-257.

Poidevin, R. L. (2012). Kenosis, Necessity and Incarnation. The Heythrop Journal, 54/2, pp. 214-227.

Powell, S. M. (2009). The Trinity in German Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rahner, K. (2005). The Trinity. New York. Crossroad Publishing Company.

Senor, T. (2011). Drawing on Many traditions: an Ecumenical Kenotic Christology. In A. Marmadoro and J. Hill (eds.), In The Metaphysics of the Incarnation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 88-113.

Silva, M. (2005). Philippians. (2^nd ed.). Grand Rapids: Baker Academic.

Studer, B. (1993). Trinity and Incarnation, The Faith of the early Church. Edinburgh: T&T Clark Ltd.

Stump, E., and Kretzmann, N. (1985). Absolute Simplicity. Faith and Philosophy, 2/4, 353-382.

Swinburne, R. (1994). The Christian God. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Swinburne, R. (2008). Was Jesus God?. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tanner, N. P. (1990). Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, Volume 1. London, Washington: Sheed & Ward Limited and Georgetown University Press.

Thomasius, G. (1965). Christ’s Person and Work. Part II: The Person of the Mediator. In C. Welch (ed.), God and Incarnation in Mid-Nineteenth Century German Theology. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 31-101.

Thompson, T. R. (2006). Nineteenth-Century Kenotic Christology: The Waxing, Waning and Weighing of a Quest for a Coherent Orthodoxy. In C. S. Evans (ed.), Exploring Kenotic Christology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 74-111.

Thompson, T. R., and Plantinga, C. (2006). Trinity and Kenosis. In C. S. Evans (ed.), Exploring Kenotic Christology. Oxford: Oxford university Press, pp. 165-189.

Weinandy, T. G. (2001). Does God Suffer?. Edinburgh: T&T Clark Ltd.

Wells, D. F. (1984). The Person of Christ. Illinois: Crossway Books.

Whitacre, R. A. (1999). John. Leicester: InterVarsity Press.

Wiles, M. (1977). Christianity Without Incarnation?. In J. Hick (ed.), The Myth of God Incarnate.  London: SCM Press Ltd, pp.1-10.

Williams, R. R. (1994). Introduction. In I. A. Dorner (ed.), Divine Immutability. (First Fortress Press ed.). Minneapolis: Fortress Press, pp. 1-38.

Wolterstorff, N. (1991). Divine Simplicity. Philosophical Perspective, 1/5, pp.531-552.

Wright, N. T. (1986). ἁρπαγμός and the Meaning of Philippians 2: 5-11. The Journal of Theological Studies, 37, 321-352.

Young, F. M. (2010). From Nicea to Chalcedon. (2^nd ed.). London: SCM Press.

Appendix

An important section of the council of Chalcedon’s “Definition of the Faith” (Norris, 1980, 159):

“Following, therefore, the holy fathers, we confess one and the same Son, who is our Lord Jesus Christ, and we all agree in teaching that this very same Son is complete in his deity and complete—the very same—in his humanity, truly God and truly a human being, this very same one being composed of a rational soul and a body, coessential with the Father as to his deity and coessential with us—the very same one—as to his humanity, being like us in every respect apart from sin.  As to his deity, he was born from the Father before the ages, but as to his humanity, the very same one was born in the last days from the Virgin Mary, the Mother of God, for our sake and the sake of our salvation: one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only Begotten, acknowledged to be unconfusedly, unalterably, undividedly, inseparably in two natures, since the difference of the natures is not destroyed because of the union, but on the contrary, the character of each nature is preserved and comes together in one person and one hypostasis, not divided or torn into two persons but one and the same Son and only-begotten God, Logos, Lord Jesus Christ—just as in earlier times the prophets and also the Lord Jesus Christ himself taught us about him, and the symbol of our Fathers transmitted to us.”

An important section of the third council of Constantinople (Tanner, 1990, 129-130):

“And we proclaim equally two natural volitions or wills in him and two natural principles of action which undergo no division, no change, no partition, no confusion, in accordance with the teaching of the holy fathers. And the two natural wills not in opposition, as the impious heretics said, far from it, but his human will following, and not resisting or struggling, rather in fact subject to his divine and all powerful will. For the will of the flesh had to be moved, and yet to be subjected to the divine will, according to the most wise Athanasius. For just as his flesh is said to be and is flesh of the Word of God, so too the natural will of his flesh is said to and does belong to the Word of God, just as he says himself: I have come down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of the Father who sent me, calling his own will that of his flesh, since his flesh too became his own. For in the same way that his all holy and blameless animate flesh was not destroyed in being made divine but remained in its own limit and category, so his human will as well was not destroyed by being made divine, but rather was preserved, according to the theologian Gregory, who says: "For his willing, when he is considered as saviour, is not in opposition to God, being made divine in its entirety." And we hold there to be two natural principles of action in the same Jesus Christ our lord and true God, which undergo no division, no change, no partition, no confusion, that is, a divine principle of action and a human principle of action, according to the godly-speaking Leo, who says most clearly: "For each form does in a communion with the other that activity which it possesses as its own, the Word working that which is the Word's and the body accomplishing the things that are the body's". For of course we will not grant the existence of only a single natural principle of action of both God and creature, lest we raise what is made to the level of divine being, or indeed reduce what is most specifically proper to the divine nature to a level befitting creatures for we acknowledge that the miracles and the sufferings are of one and the same according to one or the other of the two natures out of which he is and in which he has his being, as the admirable Cyril said. Therefore, protecting on all sides the "no confusion" and "no division", we announce the whole in these brief words: Believing our lord Jesus Christ, even after his incarnation, to be one of the holy Trinity and our true God, we say that he has two natures shining forth in his one subsistence in which he demonstrated the miracles and the sufferings throughout his entire providential dwelling here, not in appearance but in truth, the difference of the natures being made known in the same one subsistence in that each nature wills and performs the things that are proper to it in a communion with the other; then in accord with this reasoning we hold that two natural wills and principles of action meet in correspondence for the salvation of the human race.”

---

[1] ‘Generally’ because in ‘Logic and the Nature of God’ (1983, 130) Davis seems to advocate the literal kenotic understanding of Phil. 2.7 without reference to contemporary exegesis, which, as will be observed is a highly doubtful interpretation.

[2] The attributes of omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence, these being the attributes that kenoticists find most difficult.

[3] It may be that these changes are described as ‘relational changes’ with “...no important consequences for the divine nature.” (Crisp, 2007, 129)

[4] It might be said that in his pre-existence the Word was dependent on the Father and Spirit, the Father on the Spirit and the Word, and the Spirit on the Father and the Word so that his reliance on the Father and Spirit does not constitute a change in God.

[5] Loke’s functional kenoticism is only slightly different to krypsis.  The difference being that Jesus has access to the divine attributes, more specifically omniscience, in his human nature, but chooses not to use them at certain points in his ministry.  In this way Jesus retains omniscience and yet limits his human access to omniscience through the use of his omnipotence.

[6] This does not necessarily include treating the Trinity as a social program as many social trinitarians do, only that it requires a genuine distinction between the divine persons.

[7] This approach seems to imply that omniscience isn’t actually given up, in which case, what is being argued for is not an ontological kenoticism but a functional kenoticism, and, as was outlined in the previous chapter a functional kenoticism is compatible with other models of the incarnation (Loke, 2012).  Furthermore Evans (2002, 256) seems to think that such an understanding implies a ‘two minds’ model.

[8] A concept of the Trinity that I think can be argued for coherently (cf. Craig and Moreland, 2003, 575-596)

[9] In that it argues for a radical reinterpretation of the traditional doctrine of God.

[10] Although, perhaps not necessarily so.  It may be that a coherent reply can be developed in order to solve the Nestorian problem.

[11] This is assuming to some extent that tradition plays an authoritative role in one’s theological methodology.