Keller's top ten evangelism tips

Keller’s top ten evangelism tips

by Tim Chester

Here are Tim Keller's top ten tips for personal          evangelism:

1.                       Let people around you know you are a Christian          (in a natural, unforced way)

2.                       Ask friends about their faith – and just listen!

3.                       Listen to your friends' problems – maybe offer          to pray for them

4.                       Share your problems with others – testify to how          your faith helps you

5.                       Give them a book to read

6.                       Share your story

7.                       Answer objections and questions

8.                       Invite them to a church event

9.                       Offer to read the Bible with them

10.                   Take them to an explore course

He apparently goes on to say that we too often start with 8-10 because we think these are what count as true evangelism, but we need to start with 1-4 with most people. Indeed we may need to loop through them several times before we can move on to 5-10.

Miracles

The equation further on in the essay didn't translate very well from word to this blog.

What are the most significant philosophical objections to religious belief in miracles, and how best might one respond from the standpoint of Christian belief?

Traditionally, Christian theism has held that belief in miracles is fundamental to its worldview.  The apostle Paul writes, “And if Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile...” (1 Cor. 15.17).  However, since the enlightenment, religious belief in miracles has been thoroughly tested.  Following on from the philosophical objections of the deists (Craig, 2008, 248), arguments against belief in miracles came thick and fast, the most prominent of these being Hume’s argument in section X of his ‘Enquiries concerning the human understanding’ (Hume, 1963).  In this current essay the best of these arguments and some of their modern day expansions will be discussed in order to determine their significance.  Following on from this the various Christian responses to these arguments will be weighed in order to find out which response is to be judged the best from the standpoint of Christian belief.  For this essay a miracle will be defined as “a violation of a law of nature by a God” (Swinburne, 1970, 11) unless otherwise stated.

There are two main lines of argumentation when it comes to philosophical objections to religious belief in miracles. One line focuses on the a priori impossibility of miracles (cf. Craig, 2008, 248; Palmer, 2001, 184) and the other, made famous by Hume, argues that miracles are so intrinsically improbable “That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous...” (Hume, 1963, 116).  The task, then, is to measure which objection (or family of objections) is the most significant.  

            On inspection, the first argument seems the weakest.  Indeed, prominent scholars like that of Mackie (1992, 23) and Palmer (2001, 184), Hume and Flew (Palmer, 2001, 186) all reject the idea that miracles can be ruled out a priori.  This a priori argument rests on the assumption that the natural law is a closed system, or as Palmer (2001, 184) writes, echoing Mckinnon, “laws of nature state what happens, anything that happens must conform to those laws.”  Naturally, if this was the case, the concept of ‘miracle’ would be logically impossible as the laws of nature could not be violated, by definition miracles could not occur. However, as has been rightly pointed out by Swinburne (1970, 26) natural laws, “describe what happens in a regular and predictable way.” Our understanding of natural law is reached by inductive reasoning and is thus based on probabilities, not necessities and therefore miracles cannot be ruled out a priori. 

            The second argument however, is much more challenging and not as easy to resolve. It is necessary to look at this in more detail to understand it more fully.  Hume’s argument from the improbability of miracles is based on two separate forms of evidence (Earman, 2000, 20), those being experience and testimony.  According to Hume there is a conflict between the two in the case of a miracle.  We have a), the testimony given by a person for the miracle and b), uniform experience which he says counts against the occurrence of miracle.  Hume argues that uniform experience always outweighs testimonial evidence for miracles, and that testimonial evidence is more likely explained in naturalistic terms (Hume, 1963, 113-114) so that a miracle can never be verified. 

Antony Flew went on to enhance Hume’s argument by focussing on historical studies with reference to miracle claims.  Flew writes, “...whether or not anything did happen in the past inconsistent with what we at present believe to be a law of nature, one cannot possibly know on historical evidence that it did so happen.” (Palmer, 2001, 217).  Flew says that by its very nature historical enquiry cannot tell us whether a miracle has occurred.  Historical evidence, then, according to Flew is subordinate to the “evidence still available to us” (Palmer, 2001, 186) and according to this evidence, which is “directly verifiable”, miracles are “physically impossible” (Palmer, 2001, 186). Flew’s argument, and Hume’s argument, poses a significant problem for religious belief in miracles.

Following on from his main argument in ‘Of Miracles’ Hume puts forward another four arguments in order to back up his claim that testimonial evidence is unreliable in assessing the miraculous (Palmer, 2001, 180).  His final argument of these four is of particular interest.  Hume (1963, 121-122) writes that 1) the aim of any miracle “is to establish the particular system to which it is attributed...”, 2) that this happens in all religions (or at least a good deal of them), and 3) therefore the miracle claims of each religion cancel each other out.  This argument seems quite strong prima facie and will be returned to later.

It is recognized, then, that Hume puts forward some fairly well reasoned arguments, and, stemming from this, modern scholars like Flew have strengthened this argument with particular reference to historical study.  Of course Hume’s arguments and those of the deists did not go unquestioned by the Christian community of the period.  Indeed, there were a plethora of responses from the religious and philosophical community in defence of religious belief in miracles by the likes of Jean Le Clerc, Jacob Vernet, Thomas Sherlock and William Paley to name only a few (Craig, 2008, 252-256).  Despite this, it was the philosophical objections to religious belief in miracles “that posterity gave an eye to...” (Craig, 2008, 259). 

It seems that there are at least two main ways in which Christians might respond to these arguments.  The first way in which the Christian could respond is by accepting the arguments against religious belief in miracles.  For example, theologians like Bultmann (Bultmann, 1953, 5) and Tillich (Palmer, 2001, 199) redefine the concept of miracle as ‘myth’ or as ‘symbolism’, thus dismissing the traditional understanding.  However, whether this is the best response for the Christian is to be questioned.

This approach is not likely to appeal to the regular Christian in the pew, nor is it in line with traditional and orthodox Christian thought as was briefly pointed out in the introduction (cf. Geivett, 2010, 595).  Moreover some scholars imply that this approach isn’t actually Christian at all, in that it leads to “Christless and even atheistic Christianity” (Craig, 2008, 248). Thus those Christians who are not inclined to the bultmanian or tillichian approach will be glad to hear that it is not the only available Christian response to objections against belief in miracles, and nor is it a necessary one.  A second and more palatable approach can be taken which retains the traditional and more orthodox stance.  The Christian and non-Christian alike (Cf. Earmann, 2000) have employed strong counter arguments in response to Hume and Flew, some so confidently and damningly so that it is alleged that Hume’s argument from the intrinsic improbability of miracle is an “abject failure” (Earmann, 2000, 3). 

One of the lines of argument that can be taken in response to Hume is appealing to the probability calculus.  Since Hume wrote ‘Of Miracles’ numerous developments in probability theory have taken place, revealing hole’s in Hume’s reasoning (Craig, 2008, 270).  He is mistaken on a number of points. Firstly, Hume focuses almost solely on the intrinsic improbability of the miraculous, ignoring the wider factors that need to be taken into account when calculating probability (Craig, 2008, 272). This is a mistake.  In calculating the probability of a miracle ‘M’ we not only need to take into account its intrinsic probability given our background knowledge ‘B’ (The nature of ‘B’ will be expanded on later), but also its explanatory power ‘E’.  The calculation is as follows (cf. Craig, 2008, 271),

Pr(M|E&B)                Pr(M|B)             Pr(E|M&B)    

                                                                =                        x

Pr(not-M|E&B)              Pr(not-M|B)       Pr(E|not-M&B)

On the right hand side of the equation we have two ratios.  Firstly, that of the intrinsic probability of ‘M’ (Pr(M|B)) and secondly, to the right, the explanatory power of  ‘M’ (Pr (E|M&B)), the denominators being the probability of their negations.  If the explanatory power of ‘M’ is sufficiently high to be equal to or greater than the intrinsic improbability of the miracle, then ‘M’ may be more probable than not (Craig, 2008, 272).  What is shown by the probability calculus is that Hume’s argument is flawed in that he leaves out significant factors contributing to calculating the probability of ‘M’.  He gets close to understanding this, but ultimately fails to expand on or develop this sufficiently (Craig 2008, 272).

            Secondly, Hume incorrectly goes about calculating the intrinsic probability of ‘M’ by using the frequency model of probability. Craig (2008, 274) paraphrases Earman in pointing this out, “...the frequency model of probability simply will not work in this context.”  If one were to take this theory of probability on board it would undermine a good deal of scientific study as well (Craig, 2008, 274).  Therefore this mistake, in conjunction with the others, shows that Hume largely fails in his argument against religious belief in miracles.

            But what of Hume’s other argument, that the miracles of different religions cancel each other out?  Mackie seems to think that this argument can be dealt with or at least avoided by taking the stance of theological liberalism or pluralism (Mackie, 1992, 15).  Again, this is a viable option, but not preferable to those who are not in favour of a more liberal explanation.   Another way of responding is to point out, along with Craig (2008, 277) that the question is ‘empirical’ and demands investigation as to whether the evidence supports a Christian claim (the resurrection for example) as opposed to a non-Christian miracle claim. Earman (2000, 70) agrees in that Hume had to “...leave the high ground and descend into the trenches where...there were opponents...[who] were prepared to argue for...the superiority of the New Testament miracle stories over heathen miracle stories.” 

What can be said of Antony Flew’s argument against religious belief in miracles on historical evidence?  As it happens, this argument, like those of Hume has also been challenged.  Flew’s argument rests on the proposition that historical evidence is subordinate to scientific evidence on the grounds that “scientific propositions, unlike statements about the past, can be repeatedly verified.” (Palmer, 2001, 192, cf. Swinburne, 1970, 42).  But as Swinburne (1970, 42) points out, “We can go on and on testing for the truth of historical as of scientific propositions”. Both historical and scientific propositions are “established ultimately in a similar kind of way” (Swinburne, 1970, 43). Thus, Swinburne asks why, now, should we assume that scientific propositions take precedence over historical propositions?  “To make the supposition that they are to be treated differently is to introduce a complicating ad hoc procedure for assessing evidence.” (Swinburne, 1970, 43).  Therefore the argument put forward by Flew also fails.

            One can say therefore, that there could be enough evidence of particular kinds, to “outweigh the evidence of physical impossibility.”(Swinburne, 1970, 51).  Nevertheless, “There is, even on theistic assumptions, a strong presumption in favour of a natural explanation for any physical event.” (Geivett, 2010, 601)  Indeed those in favour of claiming that a miracle has occurred bear the burden of proof (Palmer, 2001, 195).  But in acknowledging this, one more factor should be noted in calculating the probability of the miraculous.  The crucial component in considering the probability of ‘M’ will be the intrinsic probability of ‘M’ given background knowledge ‘B’.  Thus the intrinsic probability of ‘M’ is relative to ‘B’.  If one assumes already that God doesn’t exist then the intrinsic probability of ‘M’ occurring will be very low.  However, if one assumes theism, “...and that this theism grounds a reasonable expectation that God would act on behalf of humanity-” (Geivett, 2010, 604, cf. Swinburne, 1970, 65, cf. Lewis, 1947, 4), then the intrinsic probability of ‘M’ will increase significantly.  “For if there exists a being able to produce V [violations of laws of nature] (as a god would be), it is natural to attribute them, if otherwise inexplicable, to his agency.” (Swinburne, 1970, 65).  Thus, a cumulative case could be made for Christian theism on this basis. The Christian could build up a case, by arguing for God’s existence and then going on to apply this in an argument for the occurrence of a miracle, say, the resurrection.  Therefore, not only can the Christian respond that miracles are indeed, verifiable, but they can include arguments from miracles in conjunction with arguments from natural theology to compose a cumulative apologetic (cf. Swinburne, 1970, 69).

It has been seen that numerous philosophical arguments have been made against religious belief in miracles.  It was noted that the ongoing philosophical dialogue concerning miracles originated in the enlightenment period and that Christian and none Christian alike endeavoured to understand miracle claims within the prevailing zeitgeist.  From this background, Hume’s most significant argument arose and was built on by many, the most prominent being Antony Flew.  It was shown that the Christian could respond in two main ways.  The first being to dismiss supernatural miracle claims, the second being to employ philosophical counter arguments to the objections of Flew and Hume in order to preserve the rationality of religious belief in the miraculous.  The second was deemed the best in that it retained the possibility of affirming traditional, orthodox Christian belief.  These counter arguments have been shown to be successful, and can be used positively by the Christian in an accumulative apologetic for his or her worldview as the probability of such claims largely depends on background information.  Therefore, there is good reason to think that this second approach is the best and most successful way for the Christian to respond to philosophical objections to religious belief in miracles.

Word Count: 2107

 Bibliography

Bultmann, R. (1953). New Testament and Mythology. In H. W. Bartsch (Ed.), Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate (pp 1-44). London: S.P.C.K.

Craig, W.L. (2008). Reasonable faith. (3^rd ed.). Illinois: Crossway Books.

Lewis, C.S. (1947). Miracles. London : Harper Collins Publishers.

Mackie, J.L. (1992). The Miracle of Theism. (Fifth impression.). New York: Oxford University Press.

Palmer, M. (2001). The Question of God: An introductory sourcebook. London: Routledge.

Earman, J. (2000). Hume’s Abject Failure. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc.

Swinburne, R. (1970). The Concept of Miracle. London: Macmillan and Co Ltd.

Geivett, R.D. (2010). Miracles. In C. Meister and P. Copan (Ed.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion (pp 595-605). Abingdon: Routledge.

Hume, D. (1963). Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. (2^nd ed. Impression of 1963). London, Oxford University Press.

Exegesis of Luke

Exegesis of Luke 6. 20-26

Introduction

It seems wise to begin by laying out certain assumptions I bring to the text which might affect my exegesis.  Given that there are a number of scholars who base their exegesis on different understandings of the ‘Q’ document, I shall begin by briefly laying out my thoughts on the matter.  I am inclined to agree with Boch (1994, 9) that Q is best understood, not as a single document (cf. Fitzmeyer, 1981, 66), but as “a pool of widely circulating traditions” given the lack of evidence for ‘Q’ as a single source.  Concerning the form of Lk. 6.20-26 it can be split into two sections, beatitudes (20-23) and woes (24-26).  Within these, the verses can, for the most part, be split into two clauses, a   μακάριοι (20-21) clause, also known as a macarism, or a οὐαὶ (24-25) clause followed by a ὅτι clause (cf. Nolland, 1989, 279).  The passage is placed following Jesus descent of the mountain, he then ministers to a great multitude of his disciples and people from the surrounding area (6.17).  This ‘great multitude’ come to be healed and to hear Jesus’ teaching (6.18) and following the healings and the curing of those with unclean spirits (18-19) he begins to teach (20-26).  The beatitudes and woes, then, form part of Jesus’ sermon on the plain (cf. Mt. 5.2-12 [Sermon on the Mount]) which incorporates both “dominical sayings...and parables” (Fitzmeyer, 1981, 629).

vs 20

Jesus begins his teaching by addressing his disciples with the great multitude of 6.17 still present and starts with the macarisms.  Of particular importance here are the differences between Luke’s beatitudes and Matthew’s (5.2-12) and their renderings of this first macarism.  Luke uses the term πτωχοί (poor) and though this is describing a literal condition the word also carries eschatological connotations.  This is evidenced with reference to the prophecy of 4.18 and through the fact that it is associated with the kingdom of God in 6.20 and the Son of man in 6.22 (cf. Boch, 1994, 573; Johnson, 1991, 106).  Matthew’s rendering of this beatitude draws out these spiritual connotations by adding “in spirit” (cf. Ellis, 1981, 113).

vs 21

In this verse Luke begins to emphasize eschatological reversal.  This is demonstrated through the use of the word νῦν (now) which he uses to contrast the hardships of the present with the reversal of conditions brought about by God in the future (Johnson, 1991, 106-107).  Fitzmeyer (1981, 634) points out that the use of ‘hunger’ is reminiscent of the OT eschatological banquet (cf. Isa 25:6-8; 49:10-13; Ps 107:3-9).  In addition, he (Fitzmeyer, 1981, 634) capitalises on this by postulating that the original version in Q also contains ‘thirst’ in accordance with certain OT groupings, however given the understanding of Q as a pool of traditions, outlined in the introduction, this could just as easily be attributed to variations in the Q traditions as opposed to a deliberate divergence from a single source on the part of Matthew or Luke for stylistic reasons.

vs 22

This verse anticipates the persecution of those who follow Jesus and it echoes both Lk.21.17 and Isa. 66:5 (cf. Nolland, 1989, 284), indeed, Jesus himself had already been subject to persecution (Lk. 4.29).  What this verse also shows is that the blessedness is warranted not necessarily on the basis of harshness of one’s conditions but on one’s relation to the Son of Man (Nolland, 1989, 284), though those literally living in the conditions described in these beatitudes have an advantage in that they are “undistracted by the spurious consolations of the world.” (Caird, 1990, 102)

vs 23

This verse begins with the imperative χάρητε (rejoice) followed by σκιρτήσατε (leap).  The use of σκιρτήσατε is interesting in that Luke used this same term in 1.41,44, again exemplifying the eschatological nature of this pericope (cf. Johnson, 1991, 107).  Jesus compares his followers to that of the OT prophets and how traditionally they were shunned by the Jewish people, as Stephen points out in Acts 7:52 (cf. Lk. 4:24; 13:33-34; 11:47-51; 1kgs 19:10, 14; Jer 2:30; Neh 9:26; 2 Chr 36:15-16; Nolland, 1989, 286). 

vs 24

The woes now begin, signalled by Πλὴν (but).  This time the opposites of the conditions of the first beatitudes are discussed, this first woe dealing with the rich.  This theme is drawn out again in Lk.12.13-21 in the parable of the rich fool.  But it is clear, as is pointed out by Boch (1994, 583) that the rich are not condemned purely on the basis of a socio-economic state, because, as with the term poor in 6.20, there is a spiritual theme underlying the reference to the rich.  Indeed those rich people who are encountered in Luke are excluded on the basis of their attitude not there socio-economic position (Boch, 1994, 583).  The focus is on those who have found their joy in ephemeral things, they “have received...consolation”, but for those who pursue God, they will find eternal joy.

vs 25

Here, as in 6.21 we see Luke drawing upon the nature of eschatological reversal.  Those who are full now, will one day be hungry.  There is a point to be made here concerning the use of γελῶντες (laugh) in 6.25b.  Laughter, in this context, “is that of those who feel quite happy with their present lot in life.” (Nolland, 1989, 288; cf. Fitzmeyer, 1981, 636).  Furthermore, the use of γελάω in the LXX points towards a negative nuance in that “it is often tied to laughter that is boastful, self satisfied, condescending, or rejoicing in the harm that others experience.” (Boch, 1994, 584).   This laughter is to be reversed.  That this is the meaning of γελάω in the beatitudes (Lk.6.21) is to be doubted, however, as the context of its use within a sermon that implores people to love their enemies (Lk.6.27) counts against this interpretation.

vs 26

The final woe mirrors the final beatitude in its form, the prophets of 6.23 being paralleled in this verse by ψευδοπροφήταις (false prophets).  In OT tradition “false prophets gained general approval (Isa 30:9-11; Mic 2:11; Jer 5:31; 23:16-17)” (Nolland, 1989, 288).  Thus, ‘being spoken of well by all’ follows this Jewish tradition and its understanding of false prophets. 

Conclusion

This pericope, then, articulates the nature of God’s blessing through its pronouncement of beatitudes and woes.  It makes clear that, “that blessing knows no socio-economic limitation.” (Boch, 1994, 586).  It identifies the problem with putting one’s trust in ephemeral as opposed to eternal things.  This speaks into our current consumerist age with great profundity as all too often the people of this era fall into the trap of the “fool’s paradise.” (Nolland, 1989, 288).  But this passage also sends a message out to the church.  The church should be responding to the teaching of Jesus, rejoicing in suffering, storing up treasure in heaven, and not pursuing the approval of all at the expense of the gospel.

Word Count:  1046

Bibliography

Boch, D.L. (1994). BECNT: Luke 1:1-9:50. Michigan: Baker Books.

Caird, G.B. (1990). Saint Luke. Penguin.

Ellis, E.E. (1981) NCBC : The Gospel of Luke. (Revised ed.). Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Fitzmeyer, J.A. (1981).  The Gospel According to Luke. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.

Johnson, L.T. (1991). The Gospel of Luke. Minnesota: The Liturgical Press.

Nolland, J. (1989). 35a Word Biblical Commentary Luke 1-9:20. Texas: Word, Incorporated.

Exegesis of Matthew

Exegesis of Matthew 8.23-27

Introduction

I think it wise to begin by outlining some of the assumptions I bring to the text of Matthew 8.23-27 that might affect my exegesis.  A version of the two source hypothesis seems the most coherent way of understanding Matthew; indeed, I reject the Greisbach hypothesis and agree with Markan priority.  Thus I assume that, “almost all of Matthew’s alterations of Mark can be attributed to three factors—christological interests, a desire to abbreviate, and stylistic improvements.” (Davies and Allison, 1991, 67).  The form of this pericope can be characterized as a ‘nature miracle’, demonstrating the authority of Jesus (cf. Hagner, 1993, 220) while being, at the same time, “a kerygmatic paradigm of the danger and glory of discipleship” (Bornkamm, 1963, 57).  This ‘paradigm’ becomes more convincing if one observes the proposed chiastic structure in Davies and Allison (1991, 68).  Following this, if one looks at the literary context of Mt. 23-27 one finds that it follows a pericope concerned with the challenges of discipleship (Mt. 8. 19-22).  Furthermore, Mt. 23-27 is part of a triad of miracle stories demonstrating the authority of Jesus (France, 2007, 333).  Thus Matthew is concerned with two particular themes, discipleship and Christology through the demonstration of Jesus’ authority. 

vs 23

An interesting point can be made here with reference to the differences between Matthew’s telling of the story and Mark’s (Mk. 4.35-41).  In Mark’s account the disciples take Jesus with them, whereas in Matthew’s account he has the disciples follow Jesus (ἠκολούθησαν) expressing the nature of discipleship (cf. Davies and Allison, 1991, 71) in accordance with the theme of the pericope.  What this also shows, as pointed out by Harrington (1991, 119) is that those who follow Jesus into the boat “have made their decision about the challenges” of discipleship expressed in Mt.8.19-22.

vs 24

There are two particular questions to be asked of this verse.  Firstly, why does Matthew use the word σεισμὸς (earthquake) in describing the storm?  There is some debate about this, yet I am inclined towards it being used as representative of eschatological trial in reference to the trials of discipleship (cf. Davies and Allison, 1991, 69) as opposed to Gundry’s (1982, 155) theory, that  σεισμὸς is used as “a sign of Jesus’ majesty”.  I take this line for a number of reasons. In the NT, though Matthew uses the word three times, at both Jesus’ crucifixion (27.54) and his resurrection (28.2), he also uses it to describe eschatological trial (24.7).  Gundry largely argues from the frequency of σεισμὸς use in the former.  However, in the latter use (24.7) σεισμὸς is used elsewhere apart from Matthew (Mk 13.8: Lk. 21.11; Rev. 6.12) to indicate eschatological trial.  Patristic exegetes offered a similar understanding (Davies and Allison, 1991, 69).  Furthermore the literary context also implies this use of σεισμὸς, indeed, “it is the context, not the word itself, which gives it an “apocalyptic” nuance.” (France, 2007, 335)  Given these three factors Gundry’s argument seems flawed.

            Secondly, why is Jesus portrayed as sleeping in such a violent storm?  For the answer to this question we must refer to the use of sleep in the OT. In the OT sleeping in such circumstances is often conceived as being “evidence of trust in God’s protection (cf. Job 11.18-19; pl. Pss 3.5-6; 4.8; Prov. 3.24-26).” (Hagner, 1993, 221).  Of course, this could also have been due to natural exhaustion (France, 2007, 336). 

vs 25

It is here that Matthew begins to emphasise Jesus authority (Gundry, 1982,155).  The disciples, experienced fishermen (the one’s that have been mentioned so far), turn to Jesus for help.  As opposed to Mark’s recording the disciples as asking Jesus if he cares that they might die, Matthew records the disciples as shouting ‘κύριε, σῶσον, ἀπολλύμεθα’(Save us, Lord; we are perishing.) .  Matthew has turned the statement of the disciples in Mark into “a prayer or request” (Davies and Allison, 1991, 73).  Furthermore Matthew’s rendering of the verse bears striking similarities with Jon. 1.14.  The crew of Jonah call out to God to save them, whereas in Matthew the disciples appeal to Jesus for salvation.  Later on Matthew is to expand on this distinction, “something greater than Jonah is here.” (Mt.12:41; cf. France, 2007, 336).  Thus in the disciples address to Jesus Matthew intends to show Jesus’ authority.

vs 26

Jesus then responds to the disciples.  Matthew places the rebuking of the disciples before the calming of the storm, as opposed to the Markan and Lukan accounts which place the miracle before the rebuke.  The Matthean order again stresses the importance of discipleship and its priority in this telling of the story and it also implies that Jesus is in full control of the situation (France, 2007, 336).  In reference to the rebuke, Albright and Mann (1981, 98) point out that the use of the word, “faith in the gospels means trust, confidence in the providence of God.” it is not “necessarily an appeal for loyalty to, or trust in, Jesus himself.”  Though this is the case for the gospels as a whole, I am inclined to understand the current use of ‘faith’ as a further reference to discipleship in keeping with the main theme (cf. Hagner, 1993, 222).  Following on from this Matthew leads us further towards understanding the nature of Jesus authority, indeed, he capitalises on this when Jesus goes on to calm the storm.  The OT frequently makes reference to YHWH’s control over the sea and the powers of chaos (Job 38.8-11; pl. Pss. 33.7; Prov. 8.22-31; Jer. 5.22; 31.35; cf. Davies and Allison, 1991, 74) and here is Jesus taking control of the wind and the waves and making them calm.  Clearly Matthew intends to make a Christological statement about Jesus’ authority being equal to that of God (cf. Davies and Allison, 1991, 75).

vs27

The disciples seem to understand the revolutionary nature of what has just occurred.  What also leads them to ask the question contained in this verse is that in revealing he has control over nature, Jesus reveals a new ability (Davies and Allison, 1991, 75) In the triad of miracles of which this miracle is a part, the theme of Jesus’ unique authority continues to be stressed, particularly in Mt 9:1-8 where he forgives the sins of a paralytic.

Conclusion

It has been seen that Matthew stresses two themes in this pericope, that of discipleship and the authority of Jesus.  This passage offers a great deal of Christological material that undoubtedly has great significance theologically, for when one is forming one’s Christology.  The passage also informs theological practice in its discussion of discipleship.  Given these two themes the passage is relevant to contemporary preaching in that it offers comfort for the church.  Though the church is plagued by trials and persecutions, she can know that Jesus is in control.  If someone puts their trust in Jesus they can know the security and calm that is found in him, a security and calm that is expressed definitively in Jesus’ calming of the storm.

Word Count: 1043

Bibliography

Albright, W.F. and Mann, C.S. (1981). The Anchor Bible: Matthew.  New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.

BornKamm, G. (1963).  The Stilling of the Storm in Matthew.  In G. Bornkamm, G. Barth and H.J. Held (Ed.), Tradition and Interpretation in Matthew (pp 52-57). London: SCM Press Ltd.

Davies, W.D. and Allison, D.C. (1991).  A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on The Gospel According to Matthew.  Edinburgh: T & T Clark.

France, R. T. (2007).  The Gospel of Matthew.  Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.

Gundry, R.H. (1982).  Matthew: A Commentary on His Literary and Theological Art.  Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.

Hagner, D.A. (1993). 33A Word Biblical Commentary: Matthew 1-13. Texas: Word Books.

Harrington, D.J.S.J. (1991). The Gospel of Matthew.  Minnesota: The Liturgical Press.

All English Biblical citations taken from the ESV.

Essay on Evangelism

Tim Stanyon

Word Count: 2149

Is evangelism persuading people of the truth or welcoming them into a community?  Illustrate your answer with practical examples from personal experience.

The answer to this question hinges on the definition of evangelism and the theological and practical applications of that definition.  In this essay a number of the different approaches and understandings of evangelism will be discussed and how they relate to both persuading people of the truth and welcoming them into a community.  Following on from this initial discussion a decision as to the definition of evangelism shall be reached based on the biblical data.  The fundamental theological content of this definition will then be drawn out and discussed with reference to cultural setting.  The problems posed by cultural setting for evangelism will be pointed out and practical examples of these problems will be noted.  From this an appropriate response will be formulated through investigating the nature of contextualisation.  After these factors have been taken into account a conclusion can be made as to whether evangelism is, or can ever involve, persuading people of the truth or welcoming them into a community.

Bosch (1991, 409) writes, “It remains difficult...to determine precisely what authors mean by evangelism or evangelization.”  Evangelism is a difficult term to define.  Indeed, there are a plethora of different definitions of the term available, each giving their own slant on the theology and praxis of evangelism and its place in the context of the ongoing mission of God.  There are three main ways of construing evangelism, these being, proclamation, church growth and initiation (Abraham, 1989, 40-116).  In understanding the meaning of evangelism it seems helpful to follow the line of Watson (1976, 26) by investigating the use of the word in the New Testament.  The NT Greek equivalent of evangelism, ‘εὐαγγελίζω’ “means to announce or proclaim or bring good news.” It carries a similar meaning in the OT (Watson, 1976, 26).  It is clear then, that following on from the biblical use of the term, the good news of the Christian gospel is integral to evangelism.  It would also seem that it’s verbal communication and proclamation is of incredible importance.  Indeed, this is in line with Paul’s statement in Rom.10.13 when he says, “But how are they to call on him in whom they have not believed?  And how are they to believe in him of whom they have never heard?”  Nevertheless, to define evangelism as only verbal proclamation of the gospel, though providing a neat and clear definition (Abraham, 1989, 45), would be a mistake.  This is drawn out when further attention is paid to the NT understanding of evangelism.  By looking at the evangelistic ministry of Jesus it can be seen that though the verbal proclamation of the gospel was key, this also entailed the good news being “set in action” (Watson, 1976, 28) and physically demonstrated.  Indeed, “In addition [to proclamation], they [the evangelists of the early church] taught, argued their case about Jesus Christ, gave guidance, were involved in healings, exhorted, and the like.” (Abraham, 1989, 50).  Thus, there seems to be a move on the part of the NT evangelists toward making disciples which seems difficult to reconcile with the traditional understanding of evangelism as proclamation.

            Given these factors and their main consequence, that being church growth, it has often been understood that evangelism is aimed at that end, or even that evangelism is the process of church growth itself (Abraham, 1989, 71).  Undoubtedly, if one proclaims the gospel one is justified in expecting church growth as a consequence of that proclamation.  However, there are two main problems with the church growth understanding of evangelism that need to be highlighted.  Firstly, if evangelism is defined in terms of church growth, there is a danger that the integrity of the proclamation of the gospel through acts like that of love and friendship will be turned into nothing more than a “utilitarian means or tool to increase the statistics of church membership.” (Abraham, 1989, 77)  And secondly, if church growth is evangelism, then why use the gospel at all?  In certain situations it might prove more numerically fruitful for the church to discard or set aside the gospel in favour of a more welcoming message that is more likely to improve the numerical situation of the church.  However, as has already been shown, one of the fundamental parts of evangelism is the proclamation of the gospel, and so taking this tack would be a grave mistake that could lead to a gospel-less Christianity.  Thus, “...evangelism should not, and realistically cannot, be seen as a panacea for numerical decline” even though, “...it is nevertheless right to be concerned with numbers.” (Booker and Ireland, 2005, 3). 

            Proclamation and church growth are important then, but in and of themselves they fail to define evangelism appropriately within the context of the mission of God.  Some form of the initiation model proposed by Abraham (1989, 13) and similarly Booker and Ireland (2005, 2) who define evangelism as, “...the process by which people become disciples of Jesus Christ” seems more appropriate.  Not only is this definition rooted in the proclamation of the gospel message and Jesus’ call to make disciples (Mt. 28.16-20), but it is also rooted in a commitment to other persons that does not treat them as a means to an end, yet has the aim and process of Christian discipleship in mind.

            From this brief discussion of the different approaches to, and definitions of evangelism, it has been made clear that the gospel is central to the act of evangelism.  Thus, persuading people of the truth and welcoming people into a community, taken in isolation, cannot be evangelism.  I can persuade someone of the truth that the sky is blue, and I can welcome someone into a community of tennis players, but this will not be evangelism because it is not rooted in the gospel and it doesn’t take into account the nature of evangelism, which focuses on the discipleship and initiation of persons into the kingdom of God.  Thus the next step, having established that evangelism cannot be done in separation from the gospel, will be to understand exactly what the gospel is.  If the gospel that is integral to evangelism and the activities of persuading people of the truth and welcoming them into a community cannot be coherently held together, especially with reference to cultural setting, then these activities cannot be considered evangelism.  

In his book ‘Christianity Rediscovered’ Vincent Donovan (2001, 25) writes, “I had to make the humiliating admission that I did not know what the gospel was.”  What the gospel is and understanding this, given that it is so integral to evangelism, will be of chief importance in how evangelism is approached in practice.  It is my experience that those who don’t understand this largely fail in their evangelistic attempts.  Christianity makes the claim that it’s narrative is true.  “Gospel proclamation is, in this sense, an intellectual exercise; it is a truth conveying exercise.” (Carson, 1996, 507).  This gospel is centred on the good news of Jesus Christ, his kingdom, the saving activity of God through Jesus’ death and resurrection and the opportunity for human beings to respond and take part in this ongoing narrative (cf. Wright, 2006, 176; Watson, 1976, 33; Walker, 1996, 13-14).  It is very difficult to see therefore, how the acts of persuading people of the truth of this gospel or welcoming them into a community of those who believe, are inadequate methods of communicating its message. It certainly doesn’t seem that there is a conflict between these acts and the gospel proclaimed in evangelism.  However, in stark contrast to the gospel, postmodernism and pluralism affirm that claims to universal truth are both oppressive and violent and that the very idea of an overarching metanarrative is highly suspicious (Middleton and Walsh, 1995, 70-71).  In personal experience I have recognized this attitude in evangelistic conversations.  For example, with Long Eaton Street Pastors I met a spiritualist who said something along the lines of “it’s true for you but not for me”.  Another attitude common to the postmodern zeitgeist is the view that metanarratives are social constructions (Middleton and Walsh, 1995, 71).  Indeed, I had a conversation with a friend who said, “I understand why you believe it [Christianity]; we all believe things so we don’t go crazy”.  However, the gospel immediately assaults this postmodern worldview, in which truth is what you make it.  Thus the very idea of persuading people of the truth is under suspicion in postmodernist culture.  Before you can persuade someone of the truth, they have to believe that there is a real truth to be grasped.  What this shows is that significant problems are posed by cultural setting. This could exclude both persuading people of the truth and welcoming them into a community from being evangelism, because these acts might not be helpful for making disciples of Christ.

            There is therefore a challenge at the very core of evangelism posed by cultural setting.  The Christian has to work out how the gospel should be communicated within their culture.  There is biblical evidence (cf. Acts. 17.16-34) to show that this process of contextualization has been occurring ever since the gospel was originally proclaimed.  Thus the response on the part of the Christian will be aimed at the contextualization of the gospel.  The gospel has to “be transmitted with flair and culturally fitting forms.” (Abraham, 1989, 171, cf. Newbigin, 1997, 141).    Despite the problems of cultural setting, if contextualization allows for the potentiality of persuading people of the truth or welcoming them into a community then these acts could be considered evangelistic.  There are two dangers in attempts at contextualization that must be noted.  Firstly if one goes too far in trying to make the gospel relevant to the postmodern they run the risk of dismissing its claim to truth, or diluting the gospel to such an extent that it is devoid of meaning. This danger is highlighted by Newbigin (1997, 141), “What comes to the heart of the hearer must really be the gospel, and not a product shaped by the mind of the hearer.”  Secondly, neither can the Christian go too far in the other direction.  If the gospel is not effectively contextualised then it risks becoming irrelevant and devoid of meaning.  Thus, a balance has to be achieved in the contextualization of the gospel regarding evangelism.  The process of contextualization needs to be an ongoing process analogous to ongoing changes in culture. This idea is expressed well by Carson (1996, 506), “There is intellectual content in this heralded gospel, content that must be grasped, proclaimed and taught, grasped afresh, proclaimed afresh, in an ongoing cycle.” 

            Having understood that the key to effective evangelism is through understanding and contextualizing the gospel for its relevant communication, one now has to ask whether evangelism could involve persuading people of the truth or welcoming them into a community given the right culture.  As has already been noted, the idea of persuading people of the truth will be largely irrelevant to evangelism in postmodern culture.  However, if a trip is taken back only two or three hundred years to the enlightenment where the concept of objective truth would be acknowledged, the activity of persuading people of the truth of the gospel would have been formative in the process by which people became disciples of Jesus Christ.  In our own day the contextualizing of the gospel often does involve welcoming people into the church community, but this welcome should not be divorced from the Christian claim to the truth of the gospel.  What evangelism is or involves then, is largely relative to current culture and the contextualization of the gospel so that it is appropriate for that specific culture.  Therefore, both persuading people of the truth and welcoming those people into a community have the potential for being evangelistic activities.

            In conclusion, it has been seen that at the heart of evangelism is the truth of the Christian gospel.  It has also been shown that though the concept of proclamation is integral and that the church growth model highlights concern for numbers, neither approach adequately articulates what evangelism is.  It has been seen that some form of initiation or discipleship model of evangelism is the most appropriate definition.  This discussion showed that if persuading people of the truth and welcoming people into community are done in separation from the gospel and the process by which people are made disciples of Jesus Christ then these activities cannot be considered evangelism.  Furthermore the fundamentality of the gospel to efficient evangelism was explored in relation to postmodernism and cultural flux.  It was shown that the gospel, despite being challenged by cultural setting did not exclude its communication by persuading people of the truth or welcoming them into a community.  Following this it was shown that while cultural setting could pose challenges to the way evangelism is conducted; cultural setting is in a state of constant change, showing that for effective evangelism the Christian needs to contextualize the gospel.  The process of contextualization was discussed, revealing that what constituted evangelism was largely relative to cultural setting.  This means that both persuading people of the truth and welcoming people into a community, within the right cultural setting have the potentiality of being evangelism, provided that they were rooted in the gospel.

           

Bibliography

Abraham, W. (1989). The Logic of Evangelism.  Kent: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd.

Booker, M., and Ireland, M. (2005). Evangelism- Which Way Now?. (2^nd ed.). London: church House Publishing.

Bosch, D.J. (1991). Transforming Mission. New York: Orbis Books.

Carson, D.A. (1996). The Gagging of God. Leicester: Apollos.

Donovan, V.J. (2001).  Christianity Rediscovered. (2^nd ed.). London: SCM Press.

Middleton, J.R. and Walsh, B.J. (1995). truth is stranger than it used to be.  London: SPCK.

Newbigin, L. (1997). The Gospel in a Pluralist Society. London: SPCK.

Walker, A. (1996). Telling the Story. London: SPCK.

Watson, D. (1976). I believe in Evangelism. London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd.

Wright, T. (2006). Simply Christian. London: SPCK.

All Biblical citations taken from the ESV.